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I. INTRODUCTION
Shareholders of large publicly held corporations face a well-
known collective action problem. To the extent an individual
shareholder bears all the costs of activities that benefit the entire
group of shareholders (giving the individual shareholder only a
fraction of the benefits), the individual shareholder will have marginal
incentive to pursue such collective activities. Corporations owe their
shareholders specific duties and rights. However, due to the collective
action problem, no single shareholder may seek to litigate these
rights. In the context of the federal securities laws within the United
States, the U.S. regime provides a solution: private class actions. This
Article discusses the American experience with securities class actions
and future possibilities for class actions in other countries.
Class actions, at least in theory, work to ameliorate the
collective action problem confronting shareholders. Instead of each
shareholder pursuing an individual action, the entire class may, by
relying on the efforts of the plaintiffs' representatives and attorneys,
pursue a single, unified action against a corporation and related
defendants. The class as a whole then internalizes both the full costs
of pursuing the action and the benefits from the action. Moreover,
representatives of the class can negotiate with and select the best
plaintiffs' attorneys as lead counsel to advance the litigation.
While class actions are a potentially useful mechanism to
discipline opportunistic managers and controlling shareholders, they
are not a panacea for the shareholder collective action problem. Due
to strong pressures to settle from both plaintiffs and defendants, some
commentators have argued that plaintiffs' attorneys have a strong
incentive to file frivolous complaints.1 Frivolous suits include suits in
which the plaintiffs have no expectation of finding any evidence of
fraud or culpability on the part of defendants. Arguably, frivolous
suits also include, more broadly, situations in which the plaintiffs'
expected costs of undergoing a trial exceed the expected benefits of
1. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEG. STUD. 437,
437-41 (1988) (providing a formal model of the incentive of plaintiffs' attorneys to file frivolous
suits); Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation, 10 INT'L REV.
L. & ECON. 3, 5 (1990) (same); David Rosenberg et. al., A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for
Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 3-4 (1985) (same). See generally Robert D.
Cooter & Daniel L. Rubenfield, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J.
ECON. LIT. 1067, 1075-82 (1989) (summarizing various settlement theories).
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doing so (but the plaintiffs file suit nonetheless to extract a positive
settlement from defendants unwilling to go to trial).2
Even in lawsuits that are more clearly meritorious, the
interests of plaintiffs' attorneys and the shareholder class members
may diverge, both over the size of the attorney fee award and the
effort that the attorneys expend in litigating the class action. In
addition, private class actions pose yet another problem: plaintiffs and
plaintiffs' attorneys, unlike government officials, act as profit
maximizers and will file suit only where profitable. Because many of
the costs of pursuing a class action are fixed, plaintiffs' attorneys will
not file actions for instances of securities fraud and managerial breach
of fiduciary duties involving relatively insignificant sums of money. A
minimum size effect therefore exists in determining the incidence of
securities class actions (whether frivolous or, importantly,
meritorious). For smaller firms, private class action litigation is
exceedingly rare.
In assessing securities class actions in the United States and
the desirability of other countries adopting provisions allowing for
class actions, this Article discusses the theoretical problems
surrounding class action use. Naturally, the theoretical problems do
not exist in a vacuum, and they may apply differently in varying
countries. The United States enjoys deep and liquid capital markets
with substantial trading volumes. The large market capitalization of
many firms in the United States combined with high trading volumes
lead to greater potential damage awards from a class action, giving
private plaintiffs' attorneys sufficient incentives to pursue numerous
class actions annually. The U.S. also possesses large numbers of
institutional investors and professional, specialized plaintiffs'
attorneys, both of which may affect the impact of class actions.
To provide a concrete example of how U.S.-style class actions
may fare outside the United States, the Article focuses on the specific
case of South Korea. 3 The attraction of class actions has led several
legal experts to suggest the possibility of shareholder class actions in
Korea.4  Recently, Korea enacted new legislation providing for
shareholder class actions against relatively large companies
2. For exposition purposes, this Article treats as frivolous those claims that have
absolutely no merit as well as claims with only a de minimis chance of winning at trial.
3. The Article will refer to South Korea simply as "Korea."
4. See Bernard Black, et. al., Final Report and Legal Reform Recommendations to the
Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Korea: Introduction to the Report, 26 J. CORP. L. 546, 569
(2001) (stating that "[flurther consideration should be given to the adoption of class action
lawsuits to permit shareholders to pursue violations of the Commercial Code, Securities and
Exchange Act and other provisions of Korean law relating to corporate governance.").
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commencing on January 1, 2005 (and other companies from January
1, 2007).5 Korea, nonetheless, provides a very different context than
the U.S. for class actions. Not only is Korea's economy smaller with
fewer large companies, but Korea also has a relatively small number
of attorneys per capita compared with the U.S. (and no professional
plaintiffs' attorneys). Moreover, a lack of experience in dealing with
class actions among attorneys, investors, and the courts poses
institutional challenges regarding the initiation of an effective class
action system. The problems that plague class actions in the United
States, therefore, may vary in importance when applied in a country
such as Korea. More generally, the case of Korea sheds light on
concerns lawmakers of other countries should take into account in
considering whether to adopt a U.S.-style securities class action
regime.
Part II delineates the theoretical issues with respect to
implementing a securities class action regime. Part III surveys the
empirical evidence in the United States on securities class actions
involving the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"). Part IV discusses
the implications for Korea and the recently adopted class action law in
Korea.
II. THEORETICAL ISSUES WITH SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS
Several theoretical issues exist in contemplating the value of
private securities class actions in the United States. In the mid-
1990s, the U.S. enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 (the "PSLRA") that sought to address many of these issues. In
particular, by enacting the PSLRA, Congress intended to address the
following concerns:
(1) the routine filing of lawsuits against issuers of securities and others whenever there
is a significant change in an issuer's stock price, without regard to any underlying
culpability of the issuer, and with only a faint hope that the discovery process might
lead eventually to some plausible cause of action; (2) the targeting of deep pocket
defendants, including accountants, underwriters, and individuals who may be covered
by insurance, without regard to their actual culpability; (3) the abuse of the discovery
process to impose costs so burdensome that it is often economical for the victimized
5. See infra Part IV.D (discussing the new Korean class action law). The move toward
enabling securities class actions in Korea is part of a larger movement toward strengthening
corporate governance generally in Korea. See also Hwa-Jin Kim, Toward the "Best Practice"
Model in a Globalizing Market: Recent Developments in Korean Corporate Governance, 2 J.CORP.
L. STUD. 345, 345 (2002) (describing reforms in the Korean corporate governance regime and the
adaptation of Korean corporate governance to global standards).
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party to settle; and (4) the manipulation by class action lawyers of the clients whom
they purportedly represent.
6
The first three of these concerns are related to the problem of
frivolous litigation. The fourth concern deals instead with the
relationship between the professional plaintiffs' attorneys and the
plaintiff class of investors. Importantly, Congress also sought to
"encourage plaintiffs' lawyers to pursue valid claims and defendants to
fight abusive claims."'7
A. Frivolous Lawsuits
The PSLRA represents Congress's response to a perceived
litigation crisis in the early 1990s. Before its enactment, popular
wisdom held that companies that experienced little more than a large
drop in their stock price in a short period of time faced a high
likelihood of a securities fraud class action, regardless of the existence
of any actual fraud on the part of the company or its officials. Why
would a company and its directors and officers settle a case they
believed to be frivolous? Getting rid of even frivolous litigation is not
cost-free. If a court is unable to verify whether litigation is
meritorious at the start of the litigation, a class action suit may last a
considerable amount of time. During this time, defendants will incur
attorneys' fees as well as the distraction of dealing with discovery
(including lengthy depositions of the top officers) and negative
publicity affecting relations with both customers and suppliers.
Settling even nuisance litigation allows a company to avoid such costs.
In addition, many companies have liability insurance policies for their
directors and officers, many of which will not pay if the directors or
officers are found culpable at trial for violating the securities laws.8
Rather than face this prospect (even if unlikely), directors and officers
will often settle, relying on the directors and officers (D&O) liability
insurers to pay most, if not all, of the settlement award.
Congress directed several provisions of the PSLRA at
combating frivolous lawsuits. The PSLRA provides for a stay of
discovery until after the motion to dismiss. 9 Without the specter of
document production, depositions of a company's top officers, and
6. H.R. REP. NO. 369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 1103.
7. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 688.
8. See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation, 7 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 55, 57 (1991) (arguing that "differential indemnification rights, insurance policy
exclusions, and plaintiffs' counsel as the real party-in-interest create powerful incentives for
settlement").
9. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 v-4(D)(3)(B) (1934).
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other aspects of discovery, defendants of a class action may be more
willing to wait and see whether they can win on a motion to dismiss
rather than settle a claim with little merit. The PSLRA also increases
the probability that defendants will succeed on a motion to dismiss.
Plaintiffs must plead with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference of the defendants' required state of mind for antifraud
actions under the Exchange Act, including, for example, Rule 10b-5.10
In the case of Rule 10b-5 liability, plaintiffs must plead facts giving a
strong inference that the defendants acted either with actual intent or
out of recklessness.11 For Exchange Act claims, plaintiffs must also
"specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or
reasons why the statement is misleading and, if an allegation
regarding the statement or omission is made on information and
belief... [plaintiffs] must state with particularity all facts on which
that belief is formed."1 2
The PSLRA also reduces defendants' exposure to liability
related to forward-looking statements.13 The PSLRA amended the
Exchange Act and Securities Act to provide new safe harbor provisions
under Sections 21E and 27A respectively. 14 Only specified defendants
are eligible, including Exchange Act reporting issuers and those
working on an issuer's behalf.15  Forward-looking statements in
certain contexts are ineligible for the safe harbor, such as during an
initial public offering. The safe harbor imposes a requirement that
the forward-looking statements are identified and are accompanied by
meaningful cautionary language. 1 However, even if a forward-looking
statement fails to meet the meaningful cautionary language
requirement, the defendants may still take advantage of the safe
harbor to the extent that the plaintiffs fail to meet the burden of
10. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 v-4(b)(2).
11. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976) (reserving the question
of whether recklessness meets the scienter requirement). But see Fla. St. Bd. of Admin. v. Green
Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 653-54 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that recklessness meets the
scienter requirement of Rule 10b-5.); In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 535 (3d Cir.
1999) (same).
12. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78v-4(b)(2).
13. The federal securities laws define a forward-looking statement to include, among other
things, "a statement containing a projection of revenues, income (including income loss),
earnings (including earnings loss) per share, capital expenditures, dividends, capital structure,
or other financial items" and "a statement of the plans and objectives of management for future
operations, including plans or objectives relating to the products or services of the issuer." Id. at
§ 78v-5(i)(1).
14. Id. at § 78v-5.
15. Id. at § 78v-5(a).
16. Id. at § 78v-5(c)(1)(A).
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proving that the defendants had actual knowledge that the forward-
looking statement was false or misleading. 17
The liability facing particular defendants is further limited
under the PSLRA's imposition of proportionate damages for Rule 10b-
5 claims (among other Exchange Act causes of action).' 8 Under the
proportionate liability rule, defendants who do not have actual
knowledge of the fraud are liable only up to their percentage of
culpability for the fraud. 19 Even if other defendants are judgment-
proof or otherwise unable to pay their proportion of damages, paying
defendants under the proportionate liability system are generally only
liable to a maximum of 150 percent of the amount of damages for
which they are responsible. 20 The proportionate liability rule works to
protect deep-pocket defendants, such as auditors and underwriters,
who are more remote from the fraud. Because more culpability for
most corporate frauds is generally assigned to corporate insiders (who
make the actual decisions on corporate disclosures), the liability facing
outsider deep-pocket defendants is lessened. 21
Where corporate insiders are judgment-proof or otherwise
unavailable, the proportionate liability rule works to reduce the total
amount of damages that plaintiffs may expect, as the remaining
defendants are liable only up to 150 percent of the damages related to
their culpability and not for the entire unpaid amount on the part of
judgment-proof insiders. Related reforms from the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 further increase the impact of proportionate liability in
reducing the liability facing non-insider defendants. In particular,
Sarbanes-Oxley requires corporate CEOs and CFOs to certify financial
statements, 22 which increases the likelihood that a jury will find the
CEO and CFO more culpable and thus reduces the proportionate
liability of all other defendants. 23 Where the CEO and CFO are
17. Id. at § 78v-4(c)(1)(B). See also Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 803 (11th Cir. 1999)
(stating that "if a statement is accompanied by 'meaningful cautionary language,' the defendants'
state of mind is irrelevant ... ").
18. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78v-4(f).
19. Id. The jury (or if there is no jury the court) is required to make findings of fact on the
relative culpability of the defendants. Id. at § 78v-4(f)(3).
20. Id. at § 78v-4(f)(4)(A)(ii). Defendants are jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs,
however, who have a net worth below $200,000 and "whose recoverable damages under the final
judgment are equal to more than 10 percent of the net worth of the plaintiff." Id. at § 78v-
4(f)(4)(A)(i).
21. See BERNARD S. BLACK ET. AL., OUTSIDE DIRECTOR LIABILITY (working paper 2003),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=382422 (discussing the role of
proportionate liability in reducing the exposure of outside directors to liability).
22. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7241 (2002).
23. Certification may also increase the ability of plaintiffs to meet the pleading with
particularity requirement for scienter under a Rule 10b-5 action. A plaintiff may argue that
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unable to pay their full damage awards, proportionate liability results
in the plaintiff class (and indirectly the plaintiffs' attorneys) receiving
a lower return from bringing the class action. 24
Finally, the PSLRA contains an explicit requirement that
courts must review a class action on the merits - after the "final
adjudication" occurs - and impose sanctions, including the defendants'
attorneys' fees, on frivolous litigation. 25  The PSLRA's sanction
provision refers to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Some courts have held that the provision simply emphasizes the
applicability of Rule 11 without changing the standard for sanctions. 26
Any reform that works successfully to reduce frivolous suits, of
course, is difficult to condemn. While frivolous suits may still be
possible after the enactment of the PSLRA, the prospect of mandatory
sanctions, stayed discovery, and pleading with particularity (among
the other reforms) certainly raise the costs for such litigation in
addition to reducing the probability of success for plaintiffs' attorneys.
Perhaps more importantly, because these reforms such as the stay on
discovery reduce the defendants' cost of waiting for the motion to
dismiss, defendants will be more likely to seek such motions rather
than to settle. The pleading with particularity requirement then
increases the probability of defendants winning the motion to dismiss.
While the PSLRA may very well reduce the impact of frivolous
litigation, however, the Act may also work to chill meritorious
litigation. At the start of litigation, plaintiffs' attorneys may not know
enough facts to determine the merits of the litigation. Plaintiffs'
attorneys face a relatively high fixed cost in pursuing a securities
fraud class action. Regardless of the size of the class action, plaintiffs'
attorneys must research potential class action defendants, draft and
certification on the part of the CEO or CFO, despite the presence of a material misstatement or
omission, is particularized evidence of recklessness. See Kourtney T. Cowart, The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act: How a Current Model in the Law of Unintended Consequences May Affect Securities
Litigation, 42 DUQ. L. REV. 293, 309-13 (2004) (arguing that the Sarbanes-Oxley "certification
provisions requiring the establishment and maintenance of internal control systems may
persuade courts that a strong inference the defendant acted with the requisite scienter exists...
."). But see Richard A. Rosen & Daniel J. Kramer, Litigation Implications of the CEO and CFO
Certification Requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 17 NO. 1 INSIGHTS 2, 4-5 (2003)
("[Aipplication of well-settled principles should support the conclusion that Section 302
certifications have no bearing on the adequacy of scienter allegations.").
24. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 7241 (discussing how CEO certification works to increase the
culpability of insiders, thereby reducing the further exposure of outside directors to liability
under a proportionate liability regime).
25. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78v-4(c).
26. See Hartmarx Corp. v. Abboud, 326 F.3d 862, 866-67 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that the
PSLRA's sanction provision emphasizes the applicability of Rule 11 without changing the
standard for sanctions).
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file the complaint, and then respond to the inevitable motion to
dismiss. Imposing a pleading with particularity requirement, coupled
with a stay on discovery, raises these fixed costs considerably for
attorneys to pursue even claims that may turn out to be meritorious.
The stay on discovery dramatically boosts the cost of gathering
information. Where information is known solely within the defendant
company, such as an internal corporate memorandum, the plaintiff
may not have any ability of obtaining the information absent
discovery. Furthermore, the expected return from filing a class action
is reduced by the pleading requirements (to the extent the probability
of dismissal is increased). Cases that survive the motion to dismiss
then introduce additional costs to the plaintiff primarily through
discovery and the cost of going to trial if the case fails to settle.
Because pursuing a class action is costly, plaintiffs' attorneys
may opt not to file suit against some companies that potentially may
have engaged in actual fraud. Particularly for companies offering only
a small dollar amount of securities and, in the case of secondary
market fraud, companies that have only a small market capitalization
and trading volume, plaintiffs' attorneys may find that the expected
return from filing suit does not exceed the expected cost. For smaller
companies, therefore, private securities class actions may provide
neither the danger of frivolous suits nor the deterrence of meritorious
suits. The increase in costs due to the PSLRA may elevate the
minimum size threshold for plaintiffs' attorneys (whether in terms of
offering amount, market capitalization, or trading volume depending
on the type of securities claim), leaving an even greater fraction of
companies without any private enforcement mechanism against
securities fraud.
Ideally, regulatory reform would encourage, and indeed
subsidize, plaintiffs' attorneys who pursue meritorious lawsuits while
it would hinder plaintiffs' attorneys who pursue frivolous suits. 27 To
an outside observer such as a court, however, whether a lawsuit is
frivolous or meritorious is far from clear at the outset of a case.
Plaintiffs' attorneys will always say that their claims are meritorious.
In contrast, defendants and their attorneys will always claim that the
lawsuit is frivolous. No magic way of distinguishing between frivolous
and meritorious suits has yet been found.
Of course, one could say that low value fraud claims are not
important. In terms of dollar value, fraud that affects the
shareholders of low market capitalization firms will have only a
27. Indeed, this was Congress's intention behind the PSLRA. See supra notes 6-7 and
accompanying text.
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limited direct impact on the overall capital markets. However, fraud
involving low market capitalization firms often involves initial public
offerings ("IPO") and other newer, entrepreneurial-stage companies.
Uncontrolled, fraud in the IPO market may result in investors
requiring unduly high discounts to purchase such shares, hurting the
ability of newer companies to turn to the capital markets for
financing. Even where fraud impacts lower market capitalization
value companies disproportionately, the impact of the fraud
aggregated over the large number of small companies may be
nonetheless significant.
B. Plaintiffs'Attorney Agency Problems
Even for meritorious litigation, plaintiffs' attorneys may not
have the same incentives as the class. Typically, plaintiffs' attorneys
receive only a fraction of the award given to the class while they bear
the full cost of pursuing the class action litigation. Because they
expect to receive only a fraction of the award, plaintiffs' attorneys may
not expend as much effort or invest as much capital in the litigation as
they would if they could obtain the full award for themselves. All
other things being equal, plaintiffs' attorneys, therefore, may settle
meritorious litigation more quickly and for a smaller amount of money
compared with what the plaintiff class as a whole would want. To the
extent the plaintiff class is diffuse and the plaintiff representative
often only owns only a small fraction of shares (and indeed prior to the
PSLRA was often handpicked by the plaintiffs' attorneys), no real
bargaining occurs between the class and the plaintiffs' attorneys over
attorney fees. Instead, the only real check on attorneys obtaining
exorbitant fee awards is court review of the fees. To the extent that
after a settlement no party is present to contest the fee award,
however, courts may have few incentives to intervene to reduce the
fees .28
The PSLRA provides certain provisions aimed at aligning the
incentives of plaintiffs' attorneys with the plaintiff class. One
provision of the PSLRA does significantly affect the relationship of
plaintiffs' attorneys and the class: the PSLRA's lead plaintiff
28. See Bonett v. Educ. Debt Serv., Inc., No. 01-6528, 2003 WL 21658267, at *8 (E.D. Pa.
May 9, 2003) (providing an example of a court approving the requested attorney fee award); In re
Corel Corp. Inc. Sec. Litig., 293 F.Supp.2d 484, 495-98 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (same); In re Cylink Sec.
Litig., 274 F.Supp.2d 1109, 1113-17 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (same). But see In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig.,
288 F.Supp.2d 14, 16-21 (D.D.C. 2003) (awarding only 28 percent of the settlement fund as
attorneys' fees despite a request for 32 percent of the fund).
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presumption.29 The PSLRA imposes a rebuttable presumption that
the plaintiff, among those seeking to become the lead plaintiff, who
has the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class and
is otherwise an adequate representative of the class is presumptively
the lead plaintiff.30 To reduce further the probability of plaintiffs'
attorneys handpicking lead plaintiffs with whom the attorneys enjoy a
repeat relationship, the PSLRA also provides that a person may act as
lead plaintiff in "no more than 5 securities class actions brought as
plaintiff class actions pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
during any 3-year period."31 Importantly, the PSLRA and subsequent
court opinions have made clear that the lead plaintiff has the power to
select and, presumably, fire the lead plaintiffs' attorney. 32 In theory, a
lead plaintiff with a large stake in the litigation will have more
incentive to monitor the plaintiffs' attorney's effort and also be more
willing to resist excessive plaintiffs' attorney fee awards.
The PSLRA also addresses the problem of plaintiffs' attorney
power over the plaintiff class more directly. Under the Act, attorney
fees are limited to a "reasonable percentage of the amount of any
damages and prejudgment interest actually paid to the class." 33 The
settlement notice sent to the class must specifically delineate the
attorneys' fees and the costs being sought by the plaintiffs' attorneys
from the class settlement fund.34
While good on paper, the PSLRA's lead plaintiff provision faces
at least two problems. First, institutional investors may react to the
largest financial interest presumption with rational apathy. Many
institutions enjoy long-term repeat relations with public companies. A
pension fund manager who depends on the good will of managers at
many different companies may eschew developing a reputation as
someone willing to file a class action when a company's price drops.
Second, other institutional investors, especially public pension funds,
may get involved in litigation not so much to benefit the class but
29. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78v-4.
30. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78v-4 states that:
the court shall adopt a presumption that the most adequate plaintiff in any private
action arising under this title is the person or group of persons that - (aa) has either
filed the complaint or made a motion in response to a notice under subparagraph
(A)(i); (bb) in the determination of the court, has the largest financial interest in the
relief sought by the class; and (cc) otherwise satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Id.
31. Id. at § 78v-4 (a)(3)(vi).
32. Id. at § 78v-4 (a)(3)(v); see also In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 220 (3rd Cir.
2001) (discussing the lead plaintiffs right to select the lead counsel in a securities class action).
33. Id. at § 78v-4(a)(6).
34. Id. at § 78v-4 (a)(7)(C).
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instead to push the political agenda of those politicians with influence
over the public pension fund.3 5 While such plaintiffs may seek a large
class award, they may also be willing to sacrifice some of the award to
obtain a political advantage (for example, obtaining a settlement right
before an election instead of a larger settlement after the election).
III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
In considering the value of a private securities fraud class
action regime and the effectiveness in the U.S. of the PSLRA in
improving on this regime, several empirical questions derive from
foregoing discussion on the theoretical issues:
1. Did the PSLRA work to reduce the incidence of frivolous
suits (and thereby increase the proportion of cases filed based on more
meritorious factors related to actual fraud)?
2. Did the PSLRA also work to reduce the incidence of certain
types of meritorious suits (in particular those without any strong
prefiling indicia of fraud such as an accounting restatement) for firms
of all sizes?
3. Did the PSLRA raise the cost to plaintiffs' attorneys,
resulting in an increased minimum expected return threshold for
plaintiffs' attorneys to file suit, leaving smaller companies with lower
private deterrence against fraud?
4. Did the PSLRA alter the balance of power between
plaintiffs' attorneys and the investor class resulting in lower attorney
fees and more vigorous litigation of securities fraud class actions?
Shedding light on these empirical questions related to the
PSLRA will help guide future reform on securities class actions. For
example, if the PSLRA failed to reduce the incidence of frivolous
litigation, then the cost of allowing class actions may exceed the
benefits. On the other hand, if the PSLRA also imposes significant
costs on potentially meritorious litigation, resulting in a reduction in
the total number of meritorious suits, the cost of eliminating frivolous
suits may not be worthwhile.
This Part canvasses the existing empirical evidence on these
four questions and outlines further possible areas of research.
35. Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered,
93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 799-839 (1993).
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A. The Incidence of Frivolous Lawsuits
Whether lawsuit filings are frivolous or meritorious is
particularly difficult to assess. 36 Tests of frivolous litigation have
focused on a number of indirect measures.
1. Event Study Tests
One method of gauging the importance of frivolous litigation
and the impact of the PSLRA in reducing the incidence of frivolous
litigation is through an event study. An event study measures the
impact on shareholder wealth from the shift in the legal environment
due to the PSLRA. In theory, if frivolous suits represented a large
cost to companies and the PSLRA worked effectively to reduce such
frivolous suits, the stock market price of companies should have
reacted positively to the enactment of the PSLRA.
The event studies on the PSLRA focus in particular on the
following events:
(a) President Clinton's veto of the PSLRA late on December 19, 1995 (after the market
close) and rumors prior to this event,
(b) the House override of the veto on December 20, and
(c) the Senate override of the veto on December 22.
Spiess and Tkac (1997) provide an event study test of the
market reaction to both President Clinton's veto of the PSLRA and the
House override of the veto.37 Their study focused only on firms in the
biotechnology, computer, electronics, and retailing industries, all
identified as high litigation risk industries by Francis, Philbrick, and
Schipper (1994a). 3 After removing, among others, firms that had
confounding firm-specific corporate events, they generated a sample of
1485 firms from the Center for Research in Security Prices database. 39
Spiess and Tkac report that their entire sample of firms experienced a
significant negative abnormal return on December 18, 1995 that
corresponded to rumors that President Clinton would veto the
36. For example, plaintiffs' attorneys are unlikely to admit to filing a frivolous lawsuit.
Indirect proxies for frivolous lawsuits must therefore be found.
37. D. Katherine Spiess et. al., The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: The
Stock Market Casts its Vote .. , 18 MGMT. DEC. ECON. 545, 545 (1997).
38. Id. at 550 (citing Francis, Philbrick, & Schipper (1994a)). The SIC codes corresponding
to these industries are as follows: biotechnology (2833-2836 and 8731-8734), computer (3570-
3577 and 7370-7374), electronics (3600-3674), and retailing (5200-5961). Id.
39. Id.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
PSLRA. 40 They also report a significant positive abnormal return on
December 20 (of smaller magnitude than the negative return on
December 18), which Spiess and Tkac attribute to the House override
of the veto, despite the fact that Clinton's veto also took place after the
market close on December 19.41 The later Senate override on
December 22 received only an insignificant positive abnormal return.42
Spiess and Tkac interpreted their results as consistent with the
hypothesis that the market viewed the PSLRA as providing a net
benefit to the wealth of shareholders.
Spiess and Tkac also tested whether firms with relatively weak
corporate governance are benefited more or less by the passage of the
PSLRA. Firms with weak corporate governance may represent a
greater risk to shareholders of fraud; therefore, the passage of the
PSLRA may reduce the value of such firms by making even
meritorious litigation more expensive for plaintiffs to pursue.43 To test
the impact of the PSLRA on firms with weak corporate governance,
they divided their sample of firms based on the percentage of
institutional ownership, the number of institutional owners, the
ownership of insiders in the firm, and the fraction of outsiders on the
boards of the firms.44 While most of their results are inconclusive,
they did report that firms in the biotechnology industry with low
institutional investor ownership, and therefore weaker corporate
governance, received a more negative and significant abnormal
reaction to rumors of Clinton's veto on December 18 when compared
with biotechnology firms with high institutional investor ownership. 45
They interpreted this result as providing limited evidence that "[t]he
cost savings of lessened litigation under the Reform Act apparently
outweigh any concern that investors may have about an increased
ability for managerial fraud, even in the case of firms with weak
monitoring environments."46
One shortcoming of the Spiess and Tkac event study (and
indeed the other PSLRA event studies) is the focus on one particular
regulatory event rather than a series of different events. It is possible
that some other event occurred at around the same time as the
40. Id. at 554.
41. The market reaction on December 20 therefore included the market's reaction to
Clinton's veto itself in addition to the House's override of the veto.
42. Spiess, supra note 37, at 554.
43. Id. at 555.
44. Spiess and Tkac, however, do not classify "grey" outside directors with consulting and
other relationships with the firm. Id. at 551.
45. Id. at 556-57.
46. Id. at 559.
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passage of the PSLRA that may have affected particular industries in
a way that drives the event study results. Unlike event studies that
focus on multiple dates, event studies focusing just on one calendar
event (the enactment of the PSLRA) are unable to diversify away the
possibility of an industry-specific confounding event. For example,
many of the studies focus on the computer industry. If the computer
industry, but not the market generally, experienced an unrelated
positive shock in mid-December 1995, this would also generate a
positive event study result for the sample of computer industry
companies unrelated to the PSLRA.47
Johnson, Kasznik, and Nelson (2000) ("JKN") conducted a
similar event study as Spiess and Tkac (1997).48 JKN focused on a
slightly different sample, however: 489 firms in the pharmaceutical,
computer hardware, and computer software industries. 49  As with
Spiess and Tkac (1997), JKN used December 18, the day rumors of
President Clinton's possible veto started circulating, as the event date
to test the impact of the veto on the market. JKN then used the
period from December 20 to 22 to gauge the impact of the House
override on December 20 and the Senate override on December 22.
JKN reported a significant negative abnormal return for December 18
and a significant positive abnormal return for December 20 through
22, supporting the view that the PSLRA increased shareholder
welfare for firms in high litigation risk industries. 50
JKN then examined the impact of a firm's exposure risk to both
frivolous and meritorious lawsuits on the abnormal returns in their
event study. They posited that firms with a greater risk of frivolous
lawsuits will experience a more positive return from the passage of the
PSLRA. On the other hand, the stock price of firms representing a
greater risk of fraud may experience a more muted, if not negative
response to the PSLRA. They constructed a probit model of litigation
risk based on those firms identified in Securities Class Action Alert to
have faced a suit in 1994 or 1995 and compared them with those that
did not.51 For proxies of the risk of a frivolous suit, they used a firm's
47. Event studies generally correct for overall movements in the market (through an
adjustment based on the expected return as predicted using a market model). Nonetheless,
correcting for market-wide movements may not necessarily correct for industry-specific (but not
market-wide) shocks unrelated to the PSLRA legislation.
48. See generally Marilyn F. Johnson et. al., Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 5 REV. OF ACCT. STUD. 217 (2000) (investigating the
reaction of stock prices to the enactment of the PSLRA).
49. Id. at 218. The SIC Codes are as follows: pharmaceutical (2833-2836), computer
hardware (3570-3577), and computer software (7371-7379).
50. Id. at 224.
51. Id. at 223-25.
VANDERBIL T LAW REVIEW
market capitalization, stock market beta, cumulative daily return for
the first eleven months of 1995, the minimum return a firm received
(measured over any contiguous twenty-day trading period) during
1994 or the first eleven months of 1995, skewness of raw returns, and
turnover of the firm's shares. 52 For proxies of meritorious litigation
risk, JKN focused on factors associated with "aggressive" accounting,
including factors related to CEO power, 53 the level of oversight of
management, 54 the need of the firm for financing, and the leverage of
the firm. 55 JKN then weighted the firms in their portfolio based on
the litigation risk obtained from their probit model for the sample
firms.5 6 They report that while weighting the portfolio based on a
combination of the risks of meritorious and frivolous suits resulted in
an overall positive cumulative abnormal return from December 18 to
December 22 (indicating a wealth increase from the PSLRA),
weighting the portfolio solely based on the risk of a meritorious
lawsuit resulted in a statistically significant and overall negative
cumulative abnormal return.57 JKN states, "[O]ur findings suggest
that the PSLRA was less beneficial for firms at greater risk of
litigation for fraudulent activity, but that these negative effects were
dominated, on average, by the positive wealth effects associated with
restricting frivolous securities litigation."58
One problem with JKN's findings with respect to the
probability of litigation risk lies in their definition of frivolous and
meritorious suits. While factors such as market capitalization,
minimum return, and stock market beta may correlate with a
frivolous suit, they may also correlate with meritorious suits.
Plaintiffs' attorneys will not wish to file even a meritorious suit
against a small market capitalization firm with low stock market
turnover to the extent the potential damages from such a suit are low
and thus unlikely to compensate the plaintiffs' attorney for the
52. Id. at 224-25 (noting that "these variables.., capture many of the characteristics
claimed to be indicative of frivolous 'strike' suits."). These factors were found significant in
Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper (1994a) and Jones and Weingram (1996a) detailed later in the
Article.
53. The CEO power variable is correlated with, among other things, whether the CEO is
also the chairman of the board of directors and also whether the CEO is a founder of the
company. See id. at 227 (providing descriptive statistics of litigation experience and litigation
risk characteristics).
54. The level of oversight over management is derived from, among other things, the
presence of a Big 6 accounting firm, the existence of a separate audit committee, and the
presence of a block shareholder with at least 5 percent of the outstanding shares.
55. Johnson, supra note 48, at 225.
56. Id. at 229-30.
57. Id. at 230.
58. Id. at 229.
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relatively fixed costs of litigation. JKN's factors for whether a firm
faces a high risk of meritorious litigation are also not perfect. Even
firms with strong corporate governance structures may commit
fraud.59  The converse is also true; firms with weak corporate
governance may engage in honest financial reporting. Nonetheless, to
the extent firms with weak corporate governance structures are more
likely to commit fraud, JKN's factors do capture the impact of an
increased probability of fraud on the abnormal market reaction to the
PSLRA.
Ali and Kallapur (2001) provide contrary event study evidence
on the stock market's reaction to the PSLRA.60 They examined the
abnormal market reaction for firms in the biotechnology, computer,
electronics, and retailing industries, 61 giving a total number of 1589
firms in their sample.62 To gauge the market's reaction to the PSLRA,
they focused on a number of events in 1995 leading up to the ultimate
Congressional override of President Clinton's veto of the Act. Of the
six dates they characterize as increasing the probability of the passage
of the PSLRA, they report that significant abnormal returns exist on
four dates. Three of the dates have significantly negative returns;
those dates involve actions in Congress moving the PSLRA forward
through the legislative process prior to December 20, 1995.63 The
fourth event is centered on December 20, 1995, with a significant
positive abnormal return. 64
Unlike Spiess and Tkac (1997) and JKN (2000), Ali and
Kallapur interpreted December 20 as corresponding to both the
release into the market of news of President Clinton's veto of the Act,
which occurred after the market close on December 19, and the House
override vote on the veto. While Clinton's veto and the House override
of the veto provide two potentially confounding pieces of information
to the market, Ali and Kallapur interpreted the positive return on
December 20, 1995 as consistent with a positive reaction in the
59. Enron had an exemplary (at least prior to the collapse of Enron) audit committee. The
chair of the audit committee, for example, was Robert K. Jaedicke, a former dean of the Stanford
Business School. Enron, Def 14A filing (filed Mar. 24, 1997), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/72859/0000950129-97-001155.txt.
60. Ashiq Ali & Sanjay Kallapur, Securities Price Consequences of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and Related Events, 76 ACCT. REV. 431 (2001).
61. These are the same four industry groups as in Spiess and Tkac (1997). See supra notes
37-46 and accompanying text.
62. The four industry groupings are: computers (SIC 3570-3577 and 7370-7374), electronics
(SIC 3600-3674), pharmaceuticals/biotech (SIC 2833-2836 and 8731-8734), and retailing (SIC
5200-5961). Ali, supra note 60, at 436.
63. Id. at 437.
64. Id.
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market to Clinton's veto of the PSLRA. This interpretation is opposite
to how Spiess and Tkac (1997) and JKN (2000) interpreted the
December 20 market reaction.65 To further support their findings, Ali
and Kallapur examined the cumulative abnormal returns from the
day before the congressional vote on the conference committee bill on
the PSLRA, December 4, to the next trading day after the Act's
passage into law, December 26.66 They report that over this time
period, firms in their sample of high litigation risk industries
experienced a statistically significant cumulative abnormal return of
-3.48 percent, consistent with the view that the PSLRA reduced
shareholder value for such firms. 67
The event study evidence surrounding the passage of the
PSLRA is thus somewhat inconclusive. One additional event study
looked instead at the promulgation by the Ninth Circuit of a new,
tougher pleading requirement after the enactment of the PSLRA and
the reaction of companies to news of this shift in the Ninth Circuit's
pleading requirements. Johnson, Nelson, and Pritchard ("JNP")
(2000) examined the shareholder wealth effects of the Ninth Circuit's
In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. decision (reported on July 2, 1999) that
imposed a stringent interpretation of the PSLRA's pleading with
particularity standard.68 Their sample consists of firms in industries
65. Id. at 443. To support their interpretation, Ali and Kallapur provide evidence that the
abnormal returns on December 20, 1995 are significantly negatively correlated to the abnormal
returns on December 11, 1995 (when Clinton indicated to the market his intent to sign the bill).
The reversal on December 20, 1995 of the negative market reaction on December 11, 1995
provides evidence that the market reaction on December 20, 1995 is due primarily to the
market's assessment of Clinton's change of heart in vetoing the PSLRA. Id.
66. Id. at 446.
67. Ali and Kallapur also examined the stock market reaction to the defeat of California
Proposition 211 in 1996. Id. at 447-49. Proposition 211, if passed, would have significantly
watered down the PSLRA (opening the way for greater shareholder litigation). Ali and Kallapur
report a significant negative abnormal market reaction in the litigation high-risk industries to
the defeat, supporting their hypothesis that the market reacted negatively to measures designed
to reduce the ability of shareholders to bring a securities suit. Id. As a further check, Ali and
Kallapur also looked at the market reaction to several Supreme Court decisions affecting the
ability of plaintiffs to file private securities causes of actions and found a negative abnormal
reaction to the opinion in Central Bank v. Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994), eliminating aiding and
abetting liability under Rule 10b-5. Id. at 453-54.
68. Marilyn F. Johnson et. al., In re Silicon Graphics Inc.: Shareholder Wealth Effects
Resulting From the Interpretation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act's Pleading
Standard, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 773 (2000). In In re Silicon, the Ninth Circuit adopted a "deliberate
recklessness" standard for pleading fraud with particularity for securities fraud class actions.
Johnson and her fellow authors write: "Since the plaintiff cannot use discovery to determine
what the defendants knew when they were making the allegedly fraudulent statements, the case
will be dismissed unless the defendant can find evidence in public sources of the defendant's
fraudulent intent." Id. at 776. Because of the Ninth Circuit's more lenient pleading
requirements prior to the enactment of the PSLRA, the authors characterize the Ninth Circuit's
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particularly vulnerable to a securities fraud suit, which included
pharmaceuticals, computer hardware, and computer software. 69
Excluding firms already involved in a securities class action, they
ended up with a sample of 277 firms, 93 of which are headquartered in
the Ninth Circuit and 184 outside the Ninth Circuit.70 In their event
study, 71 they report a significant positive cumulative abnormal return
("CAR") for the period from July 2, 1999 to July 6, 1999 that
corresponded to news reports in the Wall Street Journal on the In re
Silicon Graphics decision. Moreover, the CAR was 2.79 percent for
firms in the Ninth Circuit while only 1.27 percent outside the Ninth
Circuit.72
To determine the differential impact of the new pleading
standards on firms with varying risks of facing securities litigation,
JNP fitted a model of litigation risk. The litigation risk model used
whether a firm faced a lawsuit in the two years prior to the passage of
the PSLRA as the dependent variable in a probit model. 73 For
independent variables they included measures they deemed more
correlated with "strike suits," such as stock price volatility and stock
price performance. 74 They also included factors likely correlated with
the merits of litigation, such as the power of the CEO, the monitoring
within the company of the CEO, and the motivation to commit fraud.75
Using their litigation risk model, JNP partitioned their sample firms
into four quartiles based on the predicted litigation risk. They found
that the firms at highest risk of litigation had a CAR of 2.61 percent
while the lowest risk firms had a CAR of 1.19 percent. The difference
between the two CARs is significant, however, at only the 10 percent
shift to a deliberate recklessness standard as a surprise to the market (and thus a good
candidate for an event study). Id.
69. The corresponding SICs are: pharmaceuticals (2833-2836), computer hardware (3570-
3577), and computer software (7371-7379). Id. at 792.
70. Id.
71. Expected returns in their event study are calculated using the market model for the 252
trading days in 1998. Id. at 805.
72. Id. at 794-95. Johnson and her fellow authors explain the positive reaction outside the
Ninth Circuit as due to the possibility that other circuits and the Supreme Court may eventually
adopt the Ninth Circuit's approach. Id.
73. Id. at 807-08.
74. Id. The measures included capitalization, equity beta, share turnover, prior cumulative
return, and return skewness. Id.
75. Id. Factors related to the monitoring of the CEO included the proportion of insiders on
the board, the share ownership of outside directors, the presence of an audit committee, the
presence of a Big 6 auditor, the presence of an outside block shareholder, whether the CEO is
separate from the chairman, and whether the CEO is a company founder. Factors related to the
motivation to commit fraud included whether the firm engaged in external financing in the two
years prior to the passage of the PSLRA and the debt-equity ratio of the firm. Id.
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level.76 When JNP repartitioned the sample based solely on non-
merit-related litigation risk factors, they found that the highest risk
quartile firms have a CAR of 2.68 percent while the lowest risk
quartile firms have a CAR of only 0.51 percent, a difference significant
at the 5 percent level. 77
2. Corporate Governance Changes
Instead of looking at the stock market reaction, another way of
measuring the importance of merit-related factors is to consider how
corporate governance interacts with securities litigation. Romano
(1991) hypothesized that litigation acts as an ex-post mechanism to
discipline managers of companies with relatively weak ex-ante
corporate governance control. 78  In her view, both litigation and
corporate governance act as a substitute means to align the incentives
of managers and shareholders. Romano tested this hypothesis along a
number of dimensions. She examined a dataset consisting of 535
randomly selected firms drawn from both currently traded and
delisted firms from the NYSE as well as Nasdaq. Within this dataset,
Romano tracked shareholder suits, including class actions and
derivative suits, occurring from the late 1960s to 1987. 79
Romano's results provide mixed evidence on the value of
shareholder litigation as a disciplining device on management. First,
she reports that shareholders suits occur infrequently, noting that
only 19 percent of her sample experienced any suit during the entire
period of her study (for a total of 139 suits).8 0 Focusing on outcomes,
Romano reports that most suits (83 of 128 suits with known
resolution) resulted in a settlement.8 1 Many of the suits settled with
no monetary relief, resulting in only cosmetic changes to the board
and attorney fee awards.8 2 The lack of monetary relief, aside from
76. Id. at 796-97.
77. Id. at 798-99.
78. Romano, supra note 8, at 55.
79. Id. at 58.
80. Id. at 59. Romano also conducted an event study around (among other events) the filing
of the suit. She reports that the -1 to 0 day cumulative abnormal return in the event study for
class action lawsuits is significantly negative. Id. at 66-67. She concludes from the negative
CAR that shareholders "do not perceive the filing of a shareholder suit as a wealth-increasing
event." Id. at 59. In contrast to Romano's conclusion, it is nonetheless possible that the filing of
a suit both (a) indicates that corporate governance changes will occur (raising shareholder
wealth), and (b) signals to the market the need for such changes (lowering the market's valuation
of the company). The negative CAR could indicate that effect (b) dominates effect (a).
81. Id. at 60.
82. Id. at 61-63. The nonmonetary relief often included minor changes in executive
compensation and adding one or two additional outside directors without changing the majority
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attorneys' fees, in many of the cases provides some support for the
possibility that frivolous suits may drive many shareholder lawsuits.
To determine the relationship of shareholder suits with other
mechanisms to discipline management, Romano examined whether
corporate governance changes occur around the time of a shareholder
suit. To control for governance changes that may occur regardless of a
suit, she collected a matching sample of firms.8 3 Compared with the
matching firm sample, Romano reports that the lawsuit sample
experienced a significantly greater turnover in the CEO and Chair of
the Board positions.8 4 Most of the CEO and Chair turnover occurred
in the year before the filing of the suit or during the lawsuit itself, not
in the year after the suit's resolution.8 5 While Romano did not find
any significant difference in the change in the overall fraction of
outside directors on the board between the samples of lawsuit and
matching firms, she reported significant differences in the turnover
numbers for individual directors. Firms having lawsuits experienced
a higher degree of board turnover compared with matching firms,
particularly in the year before the lawsuit and during the lawsuit.8 6
Romano reports that board turnover is significantly greater for
the subset of lawsuit firms that settled compared with those that
experienced a dismissal of the suit.8 7 On the other hand, Romano
reports that the change in the number of directorships in other
corporations held by those directors that departed compared with
those who stayed was not significantly different.88 This finding was
inconsistent with the hypothesis that turnover of directors is a
negative event for the directors.8 9 Romano also found evidence that
control of the board, among other things. Id. at 63. Romano explains: "A likely explanation for
cosmetic structural settlements is the need to paper a record to justify an award of attorneys'
fees to courts .. " Id.
83. Id. at 71. Firms were matched based on the same four-digit standard industrial
classification code.
84. Id. at 71-72. Romano reports that 55 percent of the CEOs or Chairs changed for the
lawsuit firms compared with 31 percent for the matching sample. Id.
85. Id. at 72. Romano also controls for the possibility that the CEO or Chair turnover is a
result of reduced profitability or an acquisition. She finds even after controlling for these factors
that lawsuit firms have a significantly greater CEO or Chair turnover compared with the
matching firms. Id. at 73-76.
86. Id. at 72-73, 78.
87. Id. Romano controls for the possibility that the board turnover is due to an acquisition
and received similarly significant results. Id. at 78.
88. Romano uses the number of other directorships held by a particular director as a proxy
for the quality and reputation of that director.
89. Id. at 79 ('The board memberships of defendant-directors who departed increased (from
4.0 to 4.2), while those of defendant-directors who remained declined (from 4.4 to 4.5) and the
difference in mean change across the groups is not significant."). Romano concludes: "we cannot
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lawsuit likelihood is significantly correlated with the presence of
outside block shareholders, 90  leading her to hypothesize that
"litigation is a complement rather than a substitute for outside block
ownership as a managerial monitoring device."91
Romano's study did not separate out suits based on their
likelihood of being frivolous or actually merit-driven, as many of the
PSLRA event studies described above do with the event study
abnormal returns.92  While Romano did examine settled versus
dismissed cases, a mix of both frivolous and meritorious suits within
the set of settled cases may exist. While one may expect that
meritorious shareholder litigation may act as a substitute mechanism
to monitor managers, 93 the same expectation does not apply to settled
suits brought for primarily frivolous reasons.
3. The Filing of Suit and Settlement Outcomes
In addition to looking at event studies and changes in corporate
governance, a number of studies have focused on the determinants of
securities fraud class action filings as well as the determinants of suit
outcomes, including, most prevalently, settlements.
Several studies are from the pre-PSLRA time period. Francis,
Philbrick, and Schipper (1994a) ("FPS") examined the determinants
behind securities class action filings as well as outcomes. 94 Their
study focused on the chemicals, computer, electronics, and retailing
industries, all of which had high numbers of securities litigation from
interpret the significantly lower board stability of lawsuit firms as confirmation of an
organizational response to litigation." Id. at 79.
90. Romano provides both a comparison of mean outside block ownership between the
lawsuit and matching sample. Id. at 72, 80. She also provides a logit model of suit incidence
(controlling for assets, earnings change, outside directorship representation on the board, inside
ownership, and prior settlements, among other factors). Id. at 82-83. In both tests, she reports
that lawsuit incidence is significantly correlated with a greater outside block ownership. Id. at
80-83.
91. Id. at 80. Romano writes: "Block ownership can mitigate the free rider problem of
shareholder litigation, for with a large enough block, the investor's prorated benefit will exceed a
lawsuit's cost." Id. In her study, Romano also provides evidence that another important
determinant of whether a company faces suit is the presence of a prior settlement fund (which is
positively related to a higher probability of a subsequent suit). Id. at 83.
92. See supra notes 37-67 and accompanying text (discussing event studies on the impact of
the PSLRA).
93. The possibility of meritorious litigation, for example, may deter managers from
engaging in fraud. Meritorious litigation may also result in corporate governance changes
leading to greater alignment of the interests of shareholders and managers.
94. JENNIFER FRANCIS ET AL., DETERMINANTS AND OUTCOMES IN CLASS ACTION SECURITIES
LITIGATION (Working Paper, 1994).
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1988 to 1991, the time period of their sample.95 They collected a
sample of ninety-one class actions involving Rule 10b-5 or Section 11
fraud allegations. 96 FPS noted that litigation in their sample was
"overwhelmingly" focused on the results of operations (such as
earnings and sales) and on the financial condition of the lawsuit
firms. 97 Examining the determinants of litigation, FPS reported that
size makes a difference in the incidence of securities class action
litigation. Compared with industry peer firms,98 lawsuit firms have
significantly larger assets, sales, market share, and market
capitalization, among other indicia of size. 99 The lawsuit firms also
pay out higher amounts of dividends to shareholders compared with
the industry peer sample. 100
To focus on determinants other than firm size, FPS constructed
a matching sample based on the same (or close) four-digit Standard
Industrial Classification ("SIC") code10 1 and firm size. FPS reports
that lawsuit firms tend to have higher beta coefficients compared with
industry peers and matched firms but do not have higher return
volatility or more instances of large stock price drops compared with
either the industry peers or matching firms. 10 2 Lawsuit firms do,
nonetheless, experience lower cumulative stock returns in the year of
the lawsuit filing.10 3
Looking at various financial performance measures (such as
earnings per share and return on assets), FPS reports no evidence
that the lawsuit firms are "less financially prosperous" than either the
industry peer or matched firms. 10 4 They do note that the lawsuit firms
have a "richer" disclosure environment than the matched firms,
indicating to them that "a rich disclosure environment is not, in and of
95. Id. at 1.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 3, 19-20.
98. Industry peer firms were selected based on the same four-digit standard industrial
classification code.
99. Id. at 9.
100. Id. at 12.
101. The Standard Industrial Classification codes group companies into similar industry
groups. For those interested in looking up the SIC code for a particular industry, see
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sicsearch.html (last visited on July 20, 2004).
102. FRANCIS, supra note 94, at 14. The author writes : "Thus our results do not support the
conventional wisdom that targets of securities class action litigation have inherently volatile
returns, at least measured relative to other firms in the same industries." Id. at 15.
103. Id. at 25.
104. Id. at 11-12.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
itself, protection against shareholder litigation. ' 10 5 Lawsuit firms also
are audited by Big 6 auditors more frequently than the industry peer
firms, 10 6 but not more than a sample matched by both industry and
size. 10 7 Focusing on outcomes, FPS failed to find a significant linear
relationship between settlement amount and estimated damages for
the fifty-five lawsuits in which they had sufficient data to estimate the
potential damage award. 108 Even so, FPS does report a significant
relationship between log transformations and ranks of settlement
amounts and potential damages, indicating a monotonic relation
between settlement and potential damages. 09
Jones and Weingram (1996a) similarly studied the
determinants of securities fraud class actions during the pre-PSLRA
period.110 They focused on two questions: (a) what factors lead to a
higher probability that a firm will experience a 10 percent or more
single day drop in the firm's price, and (b) what factors determine
whether a plaintiffs' attorney will file suit against a firm with a 10
percent price drop (for example, not all 10 percent price drops result in
a lawsuit). Combining these two questions allowed for an overall
determination of how certain factors may affect the risk of securities
litigation. Jones and Weingram focused on a sample of firm-days
where a firm experienced a 10 percent price drop from 1989 to 1992.
Among the 10 percent price drop firms, they identified those firms
that also faced a securities fraud class action related in time to the 10
percent price drop.1" ' They then added to their sample a random
selection of firm-days consisting of 5 percent of the total firm-days for
105. Id. at 3, 23-24. To determine the disclosure environment, FPS looked at the number of
pages of analyst reports, the number of PR Newswire reports, and the number of press releases
put out by a firm. Id.
106. The Big 6 auditors during the time period of the FPS study were Deloitte & Touche,
Ernst & Young, Price Waterhouse, Coopers and Lybrand, Arthur Andersen, and KPMG Peat
Marwick.
107. FRANCIS, supra note 94, at 10-11.
108. Id. at 28. FPS fit a regression model with the settlement amount as the dependent
variable and a constant together with the estimated damage award as the independent
variables. They report that the coefficient on the estimate damage award is statistically
insignificant in their regression using untransformed settlement and estimate damage award
numbers. Id.
109. Id. (significant at the 1 percent confidence level).
110. CHRISTOPHER L. JONES & SETH E. WEINGRAM, THE DETERMINANTS OF 1OB-5 LITIGATION
RISK 3 (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Stanford Law School, Working Paper No.
118, June 1996).
111. Jones and Weingram identify securities class actions from Securities Class Action Alert.
Id. at 23. Their sample consists of 203 Rule 10b-5 lawsuits associated with a 10 percent price
drop.
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all firms regardless of price drop during the 1989 to 1992 period. 112
Combining the 10 percent price drop and random samples, Jones and
Weingram provide evidence that the following were all significantly
correlated with an increased likelihood of a suit: (1) cumulative share
turnover during the year prior to the price drop, (2) higher market
capitalization, (3) lower cumulative returns over the prior year, and
(4) a low absolute share price.11 3 They provide more ambiguous
evidence with respect to stock price volatility: more volatility in the
twenty trading days leading up to a price drop is positively correlated
with greater litigation risk, while more volatility during the prior year
(excluding the twenty days leading up to the price drop) is negatively
correlated with litigation risk.1 14
Neither Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper (1994a) nor Jones and
Weingram (1996a) focused directly on the question of whether
securities litigation is primarily frivolous or meritorious. Many of
their identified risk factors - market capitalization, volatility, equity
beta, and share turnover - may represent necessary but not sufficient
factors for both frivolous and meritorious litigation. Absent these risk
factors, plaintiffs' attorneys may view a suit as providing insufficient
potential damages to cover the costs of plaintiffs' attorneys in
pursuing litigation.
Other pre-PSLRA studies focused more directly on the
importance of merit. Bohn and Choi (1996) used a sample of all the
IPO firms that went public from 1976 to 1986 (consisting of 3519
IPOs) to test whether the incidence of litigation as well as settlement
outcomes are driven by factors relating to the merits of the
litigation.11 5 Looking at suit filings, Bohn and Choi constructed a logit
model for whether a firm in their sample encountered a securities
class action related to the IPO.116 As a proxy for merit, Bohn and Choi
included a rating for the quality of underwriter associated with the
offering derived from Carter and Manaster (1990) as an explanatory
112. They drop observations for firms that have not been listed for at least 250 trading days
or that have a stock price of below five dollars or a market capitalization of below $20 million.
Id. at 24.
113. Id. at 28-29.
114. Id. at 28-29, 38. Jones and Weingram also look at the public announcements made
around a large price drop to see if any difference exists between those firms that are sued and
those that are not. After controlling for other factors that may lead to a lawsuit, however, they
find no statistically significant difference. Id.
115. James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical Evidence on
Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 912 (1996).
116. Id. at 950-52.
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variable. 117 Bohn and Choi hypothesized that to the extent higher
quality underwriters associate with higher quality offerings,
underwriter quality should be negatively correlated with the
probability of facing a meritorious suit.118 Bohn and Choi report that,
in fact, underwriter quality is weakly (at only the 20 percent
confidence level) correlated to a higher probability of suit in the logit
model, which is weakly consistent with the alternative hypothesis that
higher-quality underwriters, with deep pockets, represent desirable
targets for frivolous litigation."19
Bohn and Choi then examined the ex-ante corporate
governance structure of the IPO firms and the insider sales associated
with the IPO, comparing the lawsuit firms against a matching sample
of firms.' 20 They report no difference in the insider sales as a fraction
of the IPO offering amount. 121  Consistent with Romano's (1991)
hypothesis that litigation acts as a substitute for ex-ante corporate
governance, Bohn and Choi report that the IPO firms facing a lawsuit
have weaker corporate governance compared with the matching
sample of firms.' 22 They found that the lawsuit IPO firms had
significantly fewer outsiders sitting on their boards 23 In addition, the
number of directorships on other corporations held by the lawsuit IPO
firm's directors was also significantly less than for the matching firm's
board. 124
Bohn and Choi also analyzed those firms that settled their
class action suit to determine the influence of merit-related factors on
settlement. They fitted a regression model explaining the settlement
amount as a function of the potential damages available for an IPO
117. Id. (citing Richard Carter & Steven Manaster, Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter
Reputation, 45 J. FIN. 1045, 1054-56 (1990)).
118. Id. Among other explanatory variables, they also included controls for the offering
amount, the R&D over Sales ratio and the Ads over Sales ratio as industry controls, and whether
the offer was a firm commitment offering. Id. Firm commitment offerings involve offerings in
which the underwriter syndicate first purchases the offering from the issuer at a discount and
then resells the securities to the public. In a firm commitment offering, the underwriter puts its
own money (and reputation) on the line behind the offering.
119. Id.
120. Firms were matched based on sales and on the same three-digit standard industrial
classification code. Id. at 959.
121. Id. at 961-62. See also CHRISTOPHER L. JONES & SETH E. WEINGRAM, THE EFFECTS OF
INSIDER TRADING, SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS, CORPORATE ANNOUNCEMENTS, ACCOUNTING
RESTATEMENTS, AND SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS ON 1OB-5 LITIGATION RISK 7-10, (John M. Olin
Program in Law & Economics, Stanford Law School, Working Paper No. 139, 1996) (reporting
from their empirical study that insider sales do not increase litigation risk in a statistically
significant manner).
122. Bohn & Choi, supra note 115, at 962.
123. Id. (significant at the 5 percent level).
124. Id. at 966 (significant at the 10 percent level).
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securities class action. 125 They then fitted an alternative regression
model of the settlement amount as a function of the potential damages
as the dependent variable. For explanatory variables, Bohn and Choi
included whether the complaint alleges fraud in the historical
financial statements, the description of business of the ability of
management, or both. If merit matters, Bohn and Choi hypothesized
that the alternative model should provide greater explanatory power
for settlement outcomes. Comparing the two regressions using an F-
test, however, they found no statistically significant difference in the
fit of the two models, which is consistent with the alternate hypothesis
that the merits do not matter for settlement outcomes.
Gilbertson and Avila (1999) focused specifically on securities
class actions involving auditors during the pre-PSLRA time period. 126
Their sample consists of 314 securities lawsuits filed from 1990 to
1993 alleging fraud relating to the defendant company's common stock
price as collected from Securities Class Action Alert.127 They first
examined the time between the end of the class period, presumed to
indicate the date when the fraud is revealed to the market, and the
filing of suit. Gilbertson and Avila contended that plaintiffs' attorneys
will tend not to delay but instead will file frivolous suits soon after the
end of the class period due to competition among plaintiffs' attorneys
to be the first to file the suit in the pre-PSLRA time period. 28 For
their full sample of lawsuit firms they reported a mean delay of
seventy-eight days between the end of the class period and the filing of
suit. Within the sample, over 50 percent are filed within one week of
the end of the class period. 129
While these results may indicate that filings on the part of
plaintiffs' attorneys occur without much investigation, they are not
necessarily inconsistent with meritorious litigation. Some types of
claims, including those involving accounting restatements, may
involve large amounts of public evidence of fraud immediately at the
end of the class period, if not before. For such meritorious claims,
125. Id. at 971 ("We calculated the potential damages award for each lawsuit IPO as the
difference between the offer price and the price at the end of the class period multiplied by the
number of shares issued. Although Section 11 and Rule 10b-5 typically calculate the damages
award based on the stock price at the time of the filing of suit, we used the price at the end of the
class period to control for exogenous factors affecting the stock price between the end of the class
period and the filing of suit.").
126. L. Gilbertson and Steven D. Avila, The Plaintiffs' Decision to Sue Auditors in Securities
Litigation: Private Enforcement of Opportunism?, 24 J. CORP. L. 681, 681-86 (1999).
127. Id. at 687-88.
128. Id. at 690 ("If lawsuits are filed 'within hours or days,' this reinforces the belief that
they are filed indiscriminately . .
129. Id. at 692.
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further investigation on the part of the plaintiffs' attorneys may be
unnecessary prior to the filing of suit, leading to short filing times.
Gilbertson and Avila did not, however, control for the type of
allegation in the complaint. 130
Studies have also focused on whether the PSLRA resulted in a
reduction of frivolous suit filings after the enactment of the Act. The
effectiveness of the PSLRA in reducing frivolous litigation is
important for countries considering adoption of U.S.-style class actions
but fearful of the possibility of nuisance litigation. Johnson, Nelson
and Pritchard ("JNP") (2002) provided a test of whether merits matter
more in the post-PSLRA time period. 131 Their sample focused only on
the computer hardware and software industrieS132 and included all
firms in those industries targeted with a securities fraud class action
from 1991 to 2000, a total of 119 lawsuits.133 As a matching sample,
JNP collected data on firms from the same industry with a similar
minimum one-day return (corresponding to a large price drop) for the
250 trading days prior to the class period end. 134 Focusing on filings,
they fitted a logit model using whether a firm faces a lawsuit as the
dependent variable. Among independent variables, the JNP study
included both market capitalization and share turnover measures to
control for the potential damages possible in a lawsuit. To test for the
impact of merit, they included whether the firm experienced a
restatement during the class period, among other measures of
aggressive accounting, and insider trading related variables. 35 To
130. Gilbertson and Avila also provide evidence that auditors tend to be sued more often
when the issuer has engaged in a public offering. Id. at 698-700. As well, auditors are sued
more often when the issuer is in financial distress. Id. at 700-05. They hypothesize that in cases
where the issuer is in financial distress, the auditor represents a "deep pockets" source of money
for the plaintiffs' attorneys. Id. Confirming this hypothesis, they report that the settlement
amount is not related to whether the issuer goes bankrupt (supporting the notion that in such
situations the auditor serves as an alternative source of money). Id. at 703-04. See also Steven
P. Marino & Renee D. Marino, An Empirical Study of Recent Securities Class Action Settlements
Involving Accountants, Attorneys, or Underwriters, 22 SEC. REG. L.J. 115, 115-25 (1994) (focusing
on the liability of outside parties for securities fraud claims and contending that an issuer's
bankruptcy will not affect settlement so long as "deep-pocket professionals make up the
difference in settlement amounts.") Id. at 141.
131. MARILYN F. JOHNSON, ET. AL., DO THE MERITS MATTER MORE? CLASS ACTIONS UNDER
THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT (Working Paper, 2002), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com /sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=349500.
132 SIC 3570-3577 and 7370-7379, respectively.
133. Id. at 11-12. They identify sued firms from Securities Class Action Alert and the
Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse. Id. Fifty-one lawsuits are from the pre-PSLRA
period and sixty-eight are from the post-PSLRA period. Id.
134. Id. at 13.
135. Id. at 16-17. The insider trading related variables included both the net purchase and
sale activity for directors and top executive officers and the abnormal insider trading activity
measured as the difference from the one-year prior net trading activity. Id.
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test the significance of governance, JNP included a number of
governance-related variables, including the average tenure of outside
directors, the number of other directorships held by outside directors,
the independence of the board, and the share holdings of outsiders and
insiders. 13 6 JNP report that in the logit model fitted only for the pre-
PSLRA period, while securities fraud class actions were more likely
for higher market capitalization firms, only insider share holdings
correlated with a higher likelihood of suit among the merit-based
variables. 137 In contrast, when the logit model is fitted only for the
post-PSLRA period, both an accounting restatement (a proxy for
fraud) and the presence of net insider trading (a proxy for the motive
to engage in fraud) are significantly associated with an increased
likelihood of a lawsuit. 138 JNP interpreted this shift between the pre-
and post-PSLRA models as consistent with the theory that the merits
matter more in the post-PSLRA time period.
As a further test of the importance of the merits in the post-
PSLRA period, JNP examined the determinants of allegations made in
class action complaints. They constructed separate logit models for
whether a complaint included an accounting allegation or insider
trading allegation based on, among other factors, the presence of a
restatement in the class period and other aggressive accounting-
related variables, as well as their various measures of corporate
governance. 139 They report that the presence of a restatement is
significantly correlated with a greater likelihood of an accounting
allegation in the post-PSLRA period, but not in the pre-PSLRA time
period. 140 Similarly, the presence of net insider trading is significantly
correlated with a higher probability of an insider trading allegation in
the post-PSLRA time period, but not in the pre-PSLRA time period. 14'
JNP then looked at the outcomes of litigation by fitting a logit
model for whether a suit resulted in either a dismissal or low-value
136. Id. at 17-18.
137. Id. at 19.
138. Id. at 20. The JNP study also reports from their post-PSLRA model that firms with
outside directors who sit on more other boards are also more likely to face a suit. Id.
139. Id. at 20-21. For the logit model for the presence of an accounting allegation, the JNP
study also includes the presence of an insider trading allegation. Likewise in the insider trading
model, the JNP study includes the presence of an accounting allegation. Once a complaint is
filed, plaintiffs' attorneys face a low cost to add on more allegations. In the pre-PSLRA period,
the JNP study reports a significant positive relationship between the filing of one complaint and
the filing of the other. In the post-PSLRA period (with the onset of pleading with particularity
requirements and the requirement that each allegation must be specifically stated), they report
no significant relationship between the presence of one type of allegation and the other. Id.
140. Id. at 21.
141. Id.
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settlement compared with a higher value settlement. 42  The
independent variables of the logit model include the same accounting
restatement variable and other aggressive accounting variables used
in their earlier tests, as well as their measures of corporate
governance. JNP, however, did not include a measure of potential
damages into the settlement model.143 They noted that when fitted for
the pre-PSLRA time period, only the presence of abnormal insider
sales was significant, with a positive relationship with high-value
settlements. 44 When they fitted the logit model for the post-PSLRA
time period, they noted that the presence of an accounting
restatement is significantly related to a higher probability of a high-
value settlement. 14 5  In contrast, the insider trading variables,
including abnormal insider sales, are not significant in the post-
PSLRA model. 146 JNP concluded that their study provides evidence
that the PSLRA worked to increase the importance of factors related
to fraud in determining the filings, allegations, and outcomes of
securities class actions in the post-PSLRA time period.
Another post-PSLRA study of the merits, Pritchard and Sale
(2003), examined the impact of the PSLRA's heightened pleading
standards on the ability of plaintiffs to survive a motion to dismiss."47
142. Low-value settlements are defined as a settlement for $2 million or under and are
therefore indicative of a nuisance suit. While not a perfect division between nuisance and non-
nuisance suits, the $2 million mark provides a rough approximation. To the extent defendants
settle nuisance suits to avoid defense litigation costs as well as possible distraction on
management and negative publicity, the maximum amount defendants will settle a nuisance
claim typically will not exceed $2 million. Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 727, 740.41 (1995) (contending that "a key statistic in the merits debate is the difference
between the observed settlement amount and the amount a defendant would be willing to pay
simply to avoid the costs of mounting a defense."). In reviewing settlement data from other
studies, Grundfest adopts the rule that settlements for less than a cutoff ranging from $2.5 to
$1.5 million are nuisance in the sense that "the merits may not have mattered at all in the
resolution of the litigation." Id. at 742.43. Johnson and her fellow authors explain that they
chose not to fit a more linear model based on the size of the settlement amount due to a possible
omitted variables problem - the amount of D&O liability insurance may affect the settlement
amount, and for most companies, the D&O policy is unobtainable. See JOHNSON ET AL., supra
note 131, at 22 n.6.
143. In explanation, the authors write: "We exclude the market variables, which are relevant
to damages calculations, from this regression because the dependent variable is intended to
proxy for merit." Id. at 22.
144. Id. One could argue, however, that companies able to pay higher damages may settle
even nuisance litigation for higher amounts out of a risk averse driven fear of what might
happen at trial (and therefore may make a nuisance settlement of greater than $2 million).
145. Id. The authors also report that the amount of shares in the hands of insiders is also
positively related to a higher probability of a high-value settlement. Id.
146. Id. at 22-23. The authors write that "[t]he use by plaintiffs' lawyers of this cruder proxy
for fraudulent intent is apparently not rewarded." Id. at 23.
147. A.C. PRITCHARD & HILLARY A. SALE, WHAT COUNTS AS FRAUD? AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
MOTIONS TO DISMISS UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT (U. Mich.
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The PSLRA's heightened pleading standard is somewhat ambiguous,
leaving different circuits the ability to apply varying standards.
Pritchard and Sale's study attempts to provide evidence on the
importance of law and variances in the law across the circuits in
determining dismissal outcomes by focusing on post-PSLRA motion to
dismiss decisions in the Second and Ninth Circuits.
Pritchard and Sale's sample consisted of 150 motion to dismiss
decisions (65 Second Circuit decisions and 90 Ninth Circuit decisions)
from 1996 to 2001 obtained from Lexis and Westlaw searches among
other sources. 148 They hypothesized that more concrete accounting
claims, particularly related to revenue restatements, are more likely
to survive the heightened post-PSLRA pleading requirements. In
addition, claims involving a company that recently offered securities
or that is involved in a merger, giving the company some motive to
overstate the value of its securities, are also more likely to survive.
On the other hand, because of the PSLRA's provision of a forward-
looking statement safe harbor, they predicted that such complaints
are more likely to receive a dismissal.149
To test these hypotheses, Pritchard and Sale fitted a logit
model with dismissal as the dependent variable and various variables
related to the hypotheses as their independent variables.1 50 From the
logit model, Pritchard and Sale report that while revenue related
accounting violations are not significantly related to dismissals, other
GAAP allegations are negatively correlated with dismissals,
particularly in the Second Circuit. 151 Neither offering nor merger-
related variables are statistically significant. On the other hand,
somewhat surprisingly, forward-looking statements are correlated
with a decreased likelihood of a dismissal in the Second Circuit in
particular.152
Working Paper #03-011, 2003), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=439503.
148. Id. at 17.
149. Id. at 11-17.
150. Id. at 23.
151. Id. (significant at the 5 percent level). Pritchard and Sale also report that insider-
trading related claims are significantly and positively correlated with a dismissal. Id. They
write that this result supports the "contention that courts are skeptical of the rather noisy signal
provided by such trades. Recall that these trades are pleaded in many complaints and that the
presence of options as a form of pay is likely to increase trades by insiders, and, thereby, the
possibility of including them in pleadings." Id. at 25.
152. Id. (significant at the 5 percent level). The sample of cases facing a motion to dismiss is
not necessarily exogenous to the legal regime. The harder it is to pass through a motion to
dismiss, the more likely plaintiffs' attorneys may not file a case in the first place. The finding
that even with a forward-looking information safe harbor, the allegation of fraud involving a
forward-looking statement is correlated with a lower probability of dismissal may simply be due
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While demonstrating that differences certainly exist among the
circuits, Pritchard and Sale's study does not directly provide
information on the impact of the PSLRA itself. Rather than
comparing motions to dismiss prior to the PSLRA against such
motions after the PSLRA, the authors instead focused on post-PSLRA
dismissal motions in the Second and Ninth Circuits. The study does
not reveal what factors were important to motions to dismiss prior to
the PSLRA and how the PSLRA changed such factors.
Bajaj, Muzumdar, and Sarin ("BMS") (2003) provide analysis of
summary statistic data related to securities filing and settlement data
obtained from Securities Class Action Alert from 1988 to 1999.153
Their sample consisted of 2,167 federal court securities filings and 579
state court filings. 154 Using this sample, BMS first report that federal
court filings dropped immediately after the passage of the PSLRA in
1996. Federal court filings went from 191 in 1995 down to 119 filings
in 1996. By 1998, however, the number of federal court filings was at
a sample high of 248 filings. 155 BMS also note that the types of
allegations shifted post-PSLRA, reporting that the number of cases
alleging accounting related fraud increased, while cases alleging a
more generic failure to disclose decreased.1 56 While BMS failed to
provide any tests of the statistical significance of these filing trends,
they are consistent with the hypothesis that post-PSLRA, plaintiffs'
attorneys shifted their focus toward cases where fraud is more easily
proven, avoiding more ambiguous instances of fraud that may cost
more to prosecute and face a higher risk of dismissal pursuant to the
heightened pleading requirements under the PSLRA.
BMS also report data on settlements. They reported that the
fraction of cases settling within four years of the filing date dropped
from 57.59 percent pre-PSLRA to only 26.06 percent post-PSLRA.1 57
In addition, while 2.67 percent of cases settled within one year pre-
PSLRA, only 0.67 percent settled within one year post-PSLRA.158 To
the extent defendants will settle an even frivolous lawsuit to avoid the
to the fact that plaintiffs' attorneys only file very strong forward-looking statement cases in
anticipation of the difficulty of surviving a motion to dismiss.
153. Mukesh Bajaj et al., Securities Class Action Settlements, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1001,
1003 (2003).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1004-05.
156. Id. at 1006-07. The authors also report that the number of cases filed against auditors
and accountants dropped in 1998 and 1999 compared with earlier years. Id. at 1008.
157. Id. at 1010.
158. Id. The authors also report that the fraction of filings dismissed within four years after
the filing date also diminishes post-PSLRA from 10.89 percent pre-PSLRA down to 5.79 percent.
Id. at 1011.
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high cost of defending such an action over time (in terms of attorney's
fees, management distraction, and the cloud of litigation over the
company's business), frivolous suit settlements should occur relatively
quickly after the filing of a suit. The lower frequency of quick
settlements post-PSLRA thus provides some evidence that frivolous
suits were reduced after the enactment of the Act, although, again, the
authors provided no test of statistical significance.
BMS then examined settlement amounts after the enactment
of the PSLRA. They reported higher mean and median settlement
amounts post-PSLRA. 159 Moreover, particularly in the post-PSLRA
period, BMS reported that the mean and median settlement amounts
tend to increase the longer it takes for settlement to occur. 160 Put
another way, cases settling within one year of the filing date,
representing potentially frivolous suits, settled for the lowest amount
of money, which supports the hypothesis that defendants settle such
suits quickly, simply to rid themselves of the nuisance of defending
the suit.161
159. Id. at 1022-23. The mean settlement amount post-PSLRA is $18.09 million in their
sample (compared with $8.01 million pre-PSLRA). The median settlement amount was $4.24
million in their sample post-PSLRA (compared with $3.5 million pre-PSLRA). Id.
160. Id. at 1012. The median settlement amount for cases settled within two years of the
filing date is equal to $6.3 million. Id. at 1032. Consistent with the notion that more
meritorious cases receive higher settlement amounts, suits involving accounting practices (and
thus cases with potentially more concrete evidence of wrongdoing on the part of the company)
received a higher median settlement amount ($10 million) compared with all other settlements
(ranging from $2.675 million and $4 million). Id. at 1027.
161. Simmons (2002) also provides a summary statistic view of post-PSLRA settlements
compared with settlements prior to the PSLRA. See Laura E. Simmons, Post-Reform Act
Securities Lawsuits: Settlements Reported Through December 2001 (Cornerstone Research
Monograph, 2002), available at http://www.cornerstone.com/fram-res.html. (Her dataset
consists of 303 post-PSLRA settlements for cases filed after December 22, 1995 involving an
allegation that fraud inflated a company's stock market price and that also settled by December
2001. For the pre-PSLRA period, she collects 125 Rule 10b-5 related cases filed between January
1, 1994 and December 31, 1994.) Id. The pre-PSLRA dataset is described more fully in her
earlier monograph, Laura E. Simmons, Securities Lawsuits: Settlement Statistics for 10b-5
Cases (Cornerstone Research Monograph, 1997), available at
http://www.cornerstone.com/fram- res.html. She first reports that median and mean
settlement amounts are higher in the post-PSLRA time period. Id. at 2. On the other hand, the
frequency of settlements for less than $1 million (which may indicate a frivolous lawsuit
settlement) is not significantly different between the pre- and post-PSLRA periods. Id. In
addition, the settlement amount as a percentage of the potential plaintiffs damage award is
reduced in the post-PSLRA time period. Id. The mean settlement amount as a percentage of the
potential damage award is equal to 5.1 percent in the post-PSLRA time period and 7.2 percent in
the pre-PSLRA time period. Id. Simmons does not provide any statistical tests of her results;
thus, it is difficult to ascertain the significance of the differences she identifies. Focusing solely
on the post-PSLRA time period, Simmons also describes several factors that correlate with
higher settlement amounts (measured as a percentage of the potential damage award). She
reports that cases involving GAAP accounting allegations, accounting restatements, and auditor
defendants all resulted in a higher mean settlement amount as a percentage of the potential
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In sum, the existing literature on filings and settlements in the
post-PSLRA time period provide evidence that frivolous suits existed
prior to the PSLRA and that a shift occurred in the post-PSLRA period
toward more meritorious claims. Lawsuits relating to more obvious
indicia of fraud, such as accounting restatements, are more prevalent
in post-PSLRA filings and are more important in determining
outcomes in the post-PSLRA time period. Cases also seem to take
longer to settle in the post-PSLRA period, indicating perhaps more
work on the part of plaintiffs' attorneys in litigating these suits.
A question that arises from these empirical results, however, is
that while frivolous suits may very well be less prevalent post-PSLRA,
are meritorious suits also less prevalent? The fact that in the post-
PSLRA period merits are more important among firms that are
actually sued could result from one of two possibilities. First,
primarily frivolous suits drop out, leaving only the meritorious end of
the spectrum. In this case the PSLRA is unambiguously welfare-
increasing, at least before taking into account the costs of
implementing the Act. Second, both frivolous suits and a large portion
of the meritorious suits may drop out, leaving primarily meritorious
suits again in the set of firms that are sued, but with far different
welfare implications. 162  If the second alternative is the case,
lawmakers must then balance the gain from the loss of the frivolous
suits (reducing Type I errors) against the loss from the reduction in
meritorious suits (increasing Type II errors) to determine whether the
PSLRA in fact is worthwhile.1 63
damage award compared with cases not involving these factors. Id. at 6. Simmons reports that
the presence of a Section 11 claim or an underwriter as a defendant also correlate with higher
settlement amounts as a percentage of the potential damage award. Id. at 7. On the other hand,
she does not find evidence that insider trading allegations or the industry of the issuer correlate
with settlement amounts when other factors are taken into account (including the asset size of
the defendant company and the presence of GAAP accounting allegations). Id. at 8.
162. While this Article was in the editing stages, a couple of papers related to the question of
whether the PSLRA also deterred meritorious litigation were posted on www.ssrn.com. See
STEPHEN J. CHOI, DO THE MERITS MATTER LESS AFTER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION
REFORM ACT? (Working Paper, 2004), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=558285 (providing evidence that meritorious
claims lacking obvious hard indicia of fraud, such as an accounting restatement or SEC action,
are less likely to be filed and face a greater likelihood of receiving a dismissal or low-value
settlement in the post-PSLRA period); ERIC L. TALLEY AND GUDREN JOHNSEN, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, AND SECURITIES LITIGATION (Working Paper, 2004),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=536963 (providing evidence that
executive compensation and securities litigation work as complements and also reporting
evidence inconsistent with the hypothesis that the PSLRA reduced frivolous litigation without
also deterring meritorious suits).
163. See Lynn Stout, Type I Error, Type II Error, and the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711, 711-15 (1996) (putting forth the hypothesis that the PSLRA
may have negatively impacted meritorious litigation as well as frivolous suits); Hillary Sale,
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As discussed earlier, one reason that the PSLRA may result in
even meritorious suits dropping out is the higher costs for plaintiffs'
attorneys pursuing such litigation. 164 In particular, the PSLRA's
pleading with particularity requirements and prohibition on discovery
prior to the motion to dismiss raise costs for plaintiffs' attorneys.
Plaintiffs' attorneys who suspect actual fraud and might have been
willing to file suit prior to the PSLRA may simply choose not to do so
post-PSLRA due to these higher costs. Not all cases of actual fraud
involve obvious ex ante indicia such as accounting restatements.
Indeed, even where financial accounting fraud is alleged, a securities
class action itself may help reveal the fraud through discovery, at
least prior to the PSLRA, leading to an eventual accounting
restatement. Since the PSLRA's enactment, plaintiffs' attorneys face
far higher costs and risks from investigating for more "soft" fraud
where a restatement or other indicia of fraud does not already exist
prior to the filing of suit.
B. Class Action Incidence
A separate issue from whether the PSLRA reduces meritorious
claims involving less obvious prefiling indicia of fraud for even large
companies is the fate of smaller companies. Evidence from the pre-
PSLRA time period indicates that smaller companies rarely, if ever,
faced a securities class action. Simply put, such actions are not cost-
effective for attorneys facing a high fixed cost of litigation.
Jones (1980a) assembled a dataset of 190 public corporations
(80 chosen from among large firms based on Fortune rankings and 110
randomly selected firms) and examined the frequency with which
these firms faced a shareholder class action or derivative suit from
1971 to 1978.165 Jones looked to SEC filings for information on
shareholder suits. 166 Over the sample time period, Jones reported 228
shareholder suits filed against the 190 firms, a mean of 1.2 lawsuits
per firm. 167  Significantly, Jones reported that the incidence of
Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of The Effect of the PSLRA's Internal-
Information Standard on '33 and '34 Act Claims, 76 WASH. UNIV. L. Q. 537, 537-38 (1998)
(voicing the concern that the PSLRA's heightened pleading requirement for fraud combined with
a stay in discovery would unduly restrict meritorious litigation).
164. See supra Part II.A (discussing the increased costs for plaintiffs' attorneys due to the
PSLRA).
165. Thomas M. Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Incidence of Shareholder Derivative
and Class Action Suits 1971-78, 60 B.U. L. REV. 306, 307-08 (1980).
166. Id. at 308.
167. Id. at 312. Many of the suits involved multiple suits filed against the same firm with
substantially the same claim. Id. at 313. Looking only at disputed issues, only eighty-seven
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shareholder suit filings skewed toward the larger firms in his
sample. 168
Alexander (1991) provided an early test for the presence of
frivolous securities litigation. 169 Her sample consisted of seventeen
computer and computer-related companies that went public in the
first half of 1983.170 She calculated the total post-IPO market value
loss for each firm from the date of the IPO to March 30, 1984.171
Alexander reported that every firm with a decline in market value of
at least $20 million was sued, a total of nine out of her sample of
seventeen firms.172  Alexander also looked at the twelve worst-
performing IPOs of 1983, based on market value loss as of March 30,
1984. She reported that all the IPOs with a loss over $33 million were
sued while none of the IPOs with a loss of under $33 million were
sued.1 73 Alexander concluded that her evidence "strongly suggest[s]
that suits alleging securities violations were filed whenever the stock
price declined sufficiently following the IPO to support an award of
attorneys' fees that would make it worthwhile to bring a case."1 74
Bohn and Choi (1996) provide evidence on the incidence of
securities class action for firms conducting an initial public offering as
a function of the offering amount. 75 They examined a comprehensive
sample of all initial public offerings from 1976 to 1986, for a total of
separate disputed issues were filed against the sample of firms during the sample time period (or
a mean of 0.46 per firm for the eight-year period). Id. at 312-13.
168. Id. at 316. While the 80 large firms faced a shareholder suit on average 2.23 times
during the eight-year sample time period, the 110 randomly selected firms faced a suit only 0.45
times during the same period. Id.
169. Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 497-519 (1991).
170. Id. at 510. Alexander obtains a list of IPOs from Venture Capital Survey. Id. at 510
n.38.
171. Id. at 511-12. The total market value loss is defined as the difference between the




174. Id. at 513. Weighing in on the meritorious versus frivolous debate in the pre-PSLRA
time period, Alexander also looks to the outcomes for the nine securities class actions she
identifies in her sample. She reports that all the cases settle and, importantly, for approximately
the same fraction of the potential stakes involved in the litigation. Id. at 517. Alexander defines
the litigation stakes as the difference between the offering price and the price of the shares on
the day after the last day of the class period multiplied by the number of shares sold in the IPO.
Id. at 516. Alexander reports that five of the cases settled for between 24.5 percent and 27.5
percent of the potential litigation stakes. Id. at 517. Alexander writes that "the uniformity of
outcomes is even more surprising since it occurred despite significant litigation events in some
cases that would ordinarily be expected to have an effect on their outcomes." Id. at 519.
175. Bohn & Choi, supra note 115, at 903, 927.
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3519 IPOs.176 Obtaining information from SEC filings, they reported
that 123 of the IPO firms encountered a securities fraud class action
related to the IPO.177 Importantly, only IPOs over a minimum offering
size faced an appreciable number of class actions - less than 1 percent
of the IPOs with an offering amount of less than $5 million faced a
class action. For the 329 IPOs with less than $1.79 million as their
offering amount, only one faced a securities class action. 78 In contrast,
for those IPOs above approximately $40 million in offering amount,
over 12 percent were sued with a securities fraud class action.1 79
Assuming that small issuers are no less inclined to engage in fraud
than larger issuers, the size effect for securities class actions indicates
a lack of private enforcement for smaller offerings.
Grundfest and Perino (1997) provide summary statistic
evidence on the early post-PSLRA experience, covering 1996.180
Relevant for the question of whether size matters in securities class
actions, Grundfest and Perino reported an increase in the average
price decline for firms facing a lawsuit in the post compared with pre-
PSLRA time period.18l They explained the increase in the price
decline was necessary to show more "wrongdoing" due to the greater
obstacles the PSLRA places before plaintiffs. 8 2 On the other hand,
Grundfest and Perino also provided evidence that the mean market
176. Id. at 927.
177. Id. at 929.
178. Id. at 936 ('The most striking result from this summary data is that smaller sized
offerings hardly ever experience a securities-fraud suit."). Id.
179. Id. at 936.
180. Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, Securities Litigation Reform: The First Year's
Experience, 1015 PLI/Corp 955, 957 (1997). Similar with JNP (2002) and BMS (2003), Grundfest
and Perino also report a shift in the types of claims in the post-PSLRA time period to primarily
accounting irregularities and insider trading claims. Id. at 973-74. While about a third of the
Rule 10b-5 claims in the pre-PSLRA period involved misrepresentations of financials, Grundfest
and Perino report that about two-thirds involved such allegations in the post-PSLRA period. Id.
Grundfest and Perino also note a shift in the filing of claims toward state court. Id. at 966-68.
This shift eventually prompted Congress to preempt many of the securities claims going toward
state court in the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998. As well, Grundfest and
Perino note a large fraction of claims involving false forward-looking statements despite the
implementation of a forward-looking statement safe harbor under the PSLRA. Id. Grundfest
and Perino report that 60.9 percent of the Rule 10b-5 cases involved an allegation of a false or
misleading forward-looking statement in the post-PSLRA period. See id. See also Joseph A.
Grundfest et al.., Securities Class Action Litigation in Q1 1998: A Report to the Nasdaq From the
Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, 1070 PLI/CORP 69 (1998)
(confirming the continuation of the predominance of accounting irregularity and insider trading
allegations).
181. Grundfest & Perino, supra note 180, at 971. They report a mean one-day stock price
decline around the end of the class period for Section 10(b) litigation pre-PSLRA of 19%. The
post-PSLRA mean price decline in comparison was 31%. Id.
182. Id. at 972.
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capitalization of sued firms decreased in the post-PSLRA time
period.18 3 The Grundfest and Perino study, however, did not provide
tests of statistical significance.
C. Plaintiffs'Attorney Agency Problems
Even if the merits do matter more in the post-PSLRA time
period, another question to consider is whether this shift has resulted
in any substantial benefits for the plaintiff class in cases of
meritorious claims. Where plaintiffs' attorneys routinely dictate the
terms of attorney's fees and costs, the plaintiff class may only
fractionally gain, even for meritorious litigation. Of course, from an ex
ante point of view, shareholders may still benefit from the deterrent
effect of litigation even where much of the return goes to the plaintiffs'
attorneys from the litigation itself. Nonetheless, where plaintiffs'
attorneys shirk and fail to pursue a securities class action to the
extent the class desires, the level of deterrence against firms is
reduced.
In the pre-PSLRA time period, Jones (1980b)18 4 examined
litigation outcomes from his sample of shareholder derivative and
class actions as described in Jones (1980a) above. 8 5 He supplemented
his sample in Jones (1980a) with fifteen additional firms known to
have been involved in shareholder litigation during his sample time
period from 1971 to1978.186 Of the 348 suits in his sample where the
resolution was known, he reports that 70.7 percent resulted in
settlement. Among those cases that did not settle, most resulted in a
decision for the defendants: the plaintiffs won judgment at trial in
only 0.6 percent of the cases.18 7 Significantly, Jones (1980b) provides
limited data on attorney fees. Of the thirteen cases in this sample
where he had data, Jones reports that the mean attorney fees as a
percentage of the settlement award was 16.2 percent.188
183. Id. at 969. The mean market capitalization of a lawsuit pre-PSLRA firm was $2.08
billion while the market capitalization of a post-PSLRA firm was $529.3 million. Id. Grundfest
and Perino report that the drop in the post-PSLRA mean market capitalization is due in large
part to the lack of litigation against very large issuers (those issuers with "market capitalization
in excess of $5 billion"). Id. They explain this drop in litigation as follows: "the preponderance of
post-Reform Act litigation involves allegations of accounting irregularities and trading by
insiders. Larger, more established firms are less likely sources of material accounting
irregularities or statistically significant trading by insiders." Id. at 970.
184. See Jones, supra note 165, at 542.
185. See supra notes 165-168 and accompanying text (describing the Jones (1980a) study).
186. See Jones, supra note 165, at 543.
187. Id. at 545.
188. Id. at 567.
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Indirect evidence from the post-PSLRA period suggests that
the PSLRA did not work as intended to involve institutional investors
more greatly in securities class action litigation. Cox and Thomas
(2002) examined the role of institutional investors in both prosecuting
securities class actions and filing claims in class settlements post-
PSLRA.18 9 Through a Westlaw search of the ALLFED database, they
collected a sample of court decisions appointing a lead plaintiff from
January 1, 1996 to December 15, 2001.190 In their resulting sample of
thirty-three cases, Cox and Thomas report that sixteen of the cases
involved a non-institutional lead plaintiff, five of which were selected
over an institutional investor.1 91
Cox and Thomas's results thus present a puzzle: why are
institutional investors not taking better active advantage of the
Reform Act's lead plaintiff presumption? Indeed, to the extent the
ALLFED database represents a biased sample of the universe of all
class actions, overly representing larger claims where institutions are
more likely to participate, the lack of institutional investor activity is
most likely more pronounced for the universe of all class actions. Cox
and Thomas also provide data drawn from securities class action
administrators on the settlement awards that institutional investors
claim. For the two administrators on which they had data, they report
that institutions file only 32.78 percent and 23.01 percent,
respectively, of the claims which the institutions are eligible to file. 192
Further study is required to assess the relative power of
plaintiffs' attorneys and the plaintiff class in the post-PSLRA time
period. For example, one could examine the attorney's fees as a
fraction of the overall settlement award to see if this changed from the
pre- to post-PSLRA period. Another possibility to consider is whether
plaintiffs' attorneys may attempt to "make work" to justify higher fee
awards in the post-PSLRA time period under the expectation that
courts and the lead plaintiff may scrutinize the work of the plaintiffs'
attorneys more closely.
To test the "make work" hypothesis, one could look at the
settlement amount over the amount of time it takes to resolve the case
(the "settlement per unit resolution time"). If plaintiffs' attorneys are
working hard in an effective manner to benefit the class, it might be
189. See generally James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do
Institutional Investors Fail to File Claims in Securities Class Action?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855, 855-
65 (2002) (examining the role of institutional investors in both prosecuting securities class
actions and filing claims in class settlements post-PSLRA).
190. Id. at 859.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 876-77.
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predicted that the settlement per unit resolution time would increase
in the post-PSLRA time period. A reduction in the settlement per unit
resolution time, however, may indicate that plaintiffs' attorneys are
working less efficiently in the post-PSLRA time period, which is
consistent with the hypothesis that they are engaged in making work
to justify maintaining high fees even for relatively straightforward
meritorious cases. 193
D. Other Issues
Another indirect way of measuring the impact of securities
class actions on corporate policies is to examine how the threat of such
actions affects firm information disclosure policy. If the threat of class
actions (particularly frivolous suits) causes firms to disclose less, this
may reduce the overall amount of information in the market to the
detriment of investors.
In the pre-PSLRA period, Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper
(1994b) ("FPS") examined the relationship between the incidence of
Rule 10b-5 securities litigation and a corporation's disclosure policy. 194
They first constructed a lawsuit sample consisting of forty-five firms
in the biotechnology, computing, electronics, and retailing
industries. 195  These firms were targets of a Rule 10b-5 lawsuit
relating to an adverse earnings report during 1988 to 1992 as
identified from Securities Class Action Alert. 196  For comparison
purposes, FPS also constructed a set of fifty-one "at-risk" firms with
both a quarterly earnings per share and sales decline of at least 20
percent during 1987-1991, as reported in the Compustat database. 197
Interestingly, FPS noted that there was only one overlap between
firms in the lawsuit sample and at-risk firms. 198 Put another way,
193. Of course, a drop in the settlement amount per unit resolution time ratio may simply
indicate that the PSLRA either increased the amount of time to resolve suits, all other things
being equal, or raised the difficulty for plaintiffs' attorneys to obtain any given level of
settlement amount. Any study looking at the "make work" hypothesis would have to distinguish
among such competing hypotheses.
194. See Jennifer Francis et al., Shareholder Litigation and Corporate Disclosures, 32 J.
ACCTING RES. 137, 137-39 (1994) (examining Rule 10b-5 and its relationship with a corporation's
disclosure policy).
195. The SIC Codes for the industries are as follows: biotechnology (2833-2836 and 8731-
8734), computers (3570-3577 and 7370-7374), electronics (3600-3674), and retailing (5200-5961).
Id. at 144.
196 Id.
197. Id. at 144-45.
198. Francis and her fellow authors also report that the timing and method with which poor
earnings are disclosed also does not distinguish the lawsuit and at-risk sample of firms, despite
the argument made by others that early disclosure of poor earnings may lessen the litigation
[Vol. 57:5:14651504
2004] THE EVIDENCE ON SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS 1505
despite the statistically greater earnings decline in the at-risk sample,
most at-risk firms were not sued.
FPS posited that other factors must determine the incidence of
litigation, including possibly the existence of inflated prices prior to
the adverse earnings announcement. Inflated prices may indicate
that the firm may have misled the market prior to the adverse
earnings disclosure. 199 To test for inflated prices, they performed
event studies around the adverse earnings announcements and
reported that lawsuit firms experienced both a greater negative
abnormal return on the announcement date as well as a significantly
greater dollar amount of loss in shareholder value. 20 0 However, FPS
found no correlation between the magnitude of the market value
decline and the tone (for example, optimistic) or frequency of the pre-
announcement disclosures, which is inconsistent with the hypothesis
that inflated prices correlate with a firm misleading the market. 201
To test the role of disclosure in mitigating the risk of securities
fraud litigation, FPS examined the first disclosure containing precise
information about adverse earnings for firms in the lawsuit and at-
risk samples. A hypothesis exists that early disclosure of fraud helps
reduce a company's exposure to fraud.20 2  In contrast with this
hypothesis, FPS reported that the lawsuit sample contained a
significantly higher proportion of early disclosures about the fraud.20 3
Similarly, FPS also reported that they found no significant differences
risk. They report that "for 28 of the 45 observations in the litigation sample, the litigation was
based on an earnings forecast or a preemptive earnings disclosure, not an earnings
announcement. For 46 of the 53 observations in the at-risk sample, the negative earnings news
was not disclosed until the formal earnings announcement." Id. at 138.
199. The authors "focus on the link alleged by plaintiff that defendant firms' disclosure
strategies induced plaintiff to buy stock at inflated prices." Id. at 149.
200. Id. at 153-54. The mean drop in shareholder value for the lawsuit sample was $140.68
million while the mean drop for the at-risk sample was only $7.87 million. Id. The authors also
examine whether the lawsuit firms have more optimistic pre-earnings disclosures or analyst
forecast errors around the adverse earnings than the at-risk firms and find no significant
differences between the two samples. Id. at 162-63.
201. Id. at 157.
202. At the very least, for example, early disclosure may reduce the class period and thereby
reduce secondary market damages for Rule lob-5 liability.
203. Id. at 148. The authors write that "within the at-risk sample, 46 of 53 earnings reports
(87%) were quarterly earnings announcements, while with the shareholder lawsuit sample, 28 of
45 similar events (62%) were earnings forecasts or preemptive disclosures." Id. On the other
hand, the relationship between early mitigating disclosures and the incidence of litigation is
likely endogenous. While early disclosures may lead to a lower risk of litigation, a firm facing a
higher risk of litigation may choose to engage in more disclosures to mitigate this risk. Thus,
observing that lawsuit firms tend to make more early disclosures does not answer the question of
whether early disclosures in fact reduce the risk of litigation. The FPS study recognizes this
possibility and states that "[tihe possibility remains, however, that such disclosure may provide
benefits in the form of reduced litigation-related costs." Id.
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in analyst forecast errors between at-risk and litigation firms.20 4
Looking at the magnitude of price declines, FPS did find some
evidence nonetheless that disclosures related to a negative earnings
revision, conditioning for the type and tone of the disclosures, can
reduce the severity of the price declines for some, but not all, firms
and thereby can also reduce the expected damages in litigation. 20 5
Johnson, Kasznik, and Nelson (JKN) (2001) focused specifically
on the impact of the PSLRA's provision regarding the safe harbor for
forward-looking statements. 20 6 Their sample consisted of 523 firms
drawn from the computer hardware, computer software, and
pharmaceutical industries.207 They compared two time periods: pre-
PSLRA (calendar year 1994) and post-PSLRA (calendar year 1996).208
Looking first at how firms changed their voluntary reporting of
earnings and sales forecasts, JKN reported that the number of firms
issuing at least one forecast, as well as the total number of mean
forecasts per firm, increased significantly from the pre- to post-PSLRA
time period.20 9 They also reported that the proportion of "bad news"
forecasts, defined as forecasts worse than prior investor expectations
or the prior year's historical results, increased in the post-PSLRA time
period.210
To control for other possible factors that may affect a firm's
decision to issue a forecast, JKN fitted a logit model using whether a
firm issued at least one forecast during a particular year as the
explanatory variable. For independent variables, they included
whether the year is pre- or post-PSLRA, in addition to variables
204. Id. at 139 ("In fact, we observe more negative forecast errors for the at-risk firms than
for the litigation firms, and there is little difference in the sign or magnitude of forecast revisions
over the preceding year.").
205. Id. at 140 ("[A]though we find that the number and tone of prior disclosures had no
impact on the average market response to adverse earnings news, firm-specific tests show that
conditioning on prior and concurrent disclosures significantly reduces the magnitude of
percentage price declines observed for a subset of firms.").
206. See Marilyn F. Johnson et al., The Impact of Securities Litigation Reform on the
Disclosure of Forward-Looking Information by High Technology Firms, 39 J. ACC. RES. 297, 297-
99 (2001) (setting forth a focus on the PSLRA's statement regarding safe harbor from litigation).
207. The corresponding SIC codes are as follows: computer hardware (3570-3577), computer
software (7371-7379), and pharmaceutical (2833-2836). Id. at 305.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 306-07. Earnings and sales forecasts are obtained through searches on
Lexis/Nexis. Id. at 305-06. Comparing the pre- and post-PSLRA time periods, the authors
report that 44 percent of firms issued an earnings forecast pre-PSLRA compared with 50 percent
post-PSLRA. Id. at 306. Perhaps more importantly, 31 percent of the sample firms issued more
forecasts post-PSLRA (and 62 percent of the firms increasing disclosure issued no forecasts pre-
PSLRA). Id. at 313.
210. Id. The proportion of bad news forecasts increased from 30 percent pre-PSLRA to 37
percent in the post-PSLRA time period. Id. at 306-07.
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related to change in earnings, the asset size of the firm, and whether
the firm engaged in a public offering during the year in question or the
following year. 211 From the logit model, JKN reports a significant
increase in firms issuing long-term, positive forecasts in the post-
PSLRA period. They also report a significant increase in firms issuing
short-term, bad news forecasts, lending some support to the
hypothesis that forecasts increased post-PSLRA. 212
One fear of the forward-looking statement safe harbor is that
firms may disclose lower quality (for example, more error-prone)
forecasts once the possibility of litigation is reduced or eliminated
under the PSLRA. JKN, however, reports that forecast errors are not
significantly different in the pre- and post-PSLRA periods.213 JKN
concludes: "Taken together, our evidence does not support allegations
that the safe harbor provides a 'license to lie.' ",214
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR KOREA
So what should we make of the evidence regarding the
experience of the U.S. with private securities fraud class actions?
Further, what does this evidence tell us about the desirability of
implementing a U.S.-style securities class action regime in other
countries? Countries vary along a wide variety of dimensions
including size, type of government, and education system. Instead of
engaging in a comprehensive global analysis of how class actions
211. Id. at 308.
212. Id. at 315. The coefficient on the post-PSLRA time period is positive but significant at
only the 20 percent level for the sample covering all types of forecasts. Id.
The authors also develop a logit model for whether a firm issued more forecasts in the post-
compared with pre-PSLRA time period (l=yes; O=no). They include a measure for predicted firm-
specific litigation risk as well as differences in a firm's earnings, assets, and financing activities
between the pre- and post-PSLRA time periods as independent variables. Id. at 310. In the
model, the coefficient on litigation risk is positive and significant for the sample including all
forecasts, providing support for the hypothesis that the PSLRA's forward-looking safe harbor
helped induce more forecasts particularly for firms fearful of securities litigation. Id. at 317-18.
213. The JKN study reports that the mean forecast error (measured by the actual earnings
(or sales) minus the forecast scaled by lagged total assets) in the pre-PSLRA time period is -0.019
and the forecast error in the post-PSLRA period is -0.021 (and neither is statistically significant
from zero). Id. at 320. To control for other factors affecting the quality of forecasts, JKN fit a
model with the forecast error defined above as the dependent variable. Id. at 311. The model
includes as independent variables a dummy variable for the pre- and post-PSLRA time period,
log of total assets, whether the firm was engaged in a public offering in the year of or the year
following the forecast, the horizon of the forecast, and changes in the firm's performance. Id.
They report that the coefficient on the dummy variable for the post-PSLRA time period is not
statistically significant, in support of the hypothesis that the quality of forecasts remained
unchanged in the post-PSLRA period. Id.
214. Id. at 298.
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would perform generally across the world, this Article focuses on one
specific country: South Korea.
Korea has often looked to the U.S. securities regime as a model
for how to regulate the Korean securities markets. Shortly after the
SEC promulgated Regulation FD in 2000,215 for example, Korea
followed suit with its own version of prohibitions against selective
disclosures. 216 The recent enactment of a class action law in Korea,
moreover, makes the transferability of U.S.-style class actions to
another country a particular salient issue for Korea. This Part
assesses the desirability of establishing a U.S.-style securities class
action system in Korea.
A. The Size Effect
In considering whether to implement a private securities class
action system, regulators in Korea must first take into account the
importance of size in determining which companies will actually ever
face a securities fraud class action. As the existing empirical evidence
from the U.S. indicates, firms offering relatively small potential
damage awards for plaintiffs are rarely sued in a securities fraud class
action. The impact of the PSLRA in raising the costs of litigation
while reducing the expected benefits to attorneys who file class actions
likely further elevated the minimum potential damage award
plaintiffs' attorneys require before they file suit.
Consider the range of companies trading on the Korean Stock
Exchange ("KSE"). 217 In 2002, there were 683 companies listed on the
KSE. 218 The largest company listed on the KSE, Samsung Electronics,
had a market capitalization of U.S. $39.1 billion.219  Market
215. Regulation FD became effective in the United States in October 2000. See Selective
Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 34-43154, 2000 WL 1201556 (Aug. 15,
2000). Regulation FD works to level the playing field for information somewhat in the secondary
markets for certain publicly-held issuers. The issuer and its senior officials among others are
prohibited under Regulation FD from making selective disclosures to certain secondary market
participants, including investors that are reasonably expected to trade on the information.
216. See Kim Yon-se, Fair Disclosure Rule to Be Enforced Nov. 1, KOREA TIMES, Sept. 9, 2002
(discussing the adoption of "Fair Disclosure" rules by Korea's Financial Supervisory Service
patterned on the U.S. Regulation FD).
217. See Stephen J. Choi & Kon Sik Kim, Establishing a New Stock Market for Shareholder
Value Oriented Firms in Korea, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 277, 277-78 (2002) (discussing reform
possibilities for the Korean Stock Exchange).
218. See Korea Stock Exchange Fact Book 2002, at 31 (2003), available at http://www.kse.or
kr/webeng/what/whatjindex.jsp (last visited on Dec. 3, 2003).
219. Id. at 33. Units in Korean won were converted to U.S. dollars using the 2002 exchange
rate of 1317 won to the dollar obtained from http://en2.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tableof-
historicalexchangerates (last visited on Nov. 30, 2003).
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capitalizations dropped rapidly, however, after Samsung Electronics.
The tenth largest firm, Samsung Electro-Mechanics, had a market
capitalization of U.S. $2.5 billion in 2002.220 After taking away the
thirty largest market capitalization firms, the remaining 653 listed
firms had an average market capitalization of only U.S. $83.4 million.
In comparison, the average market capitalization for the fifty largest
listed NYSE companies in 2002 was $88.7 billion.221 In 2002, the
entire NYSE had a global market capitalization of $13.4 trillion and
about 2783 listed firms, giving an average market capitalization of
$4.82 billion.222
Whatever the loss in deterrence caused by the tendency of
plaintiffs' attorneys to file suit only against larger companies in the
U.S., the problem is only magnified in Korea. Samsung Electronics, of
course, would probably qualify under even the most stringent size
screens employed by U.S. plaintiffs' attorneys. Perhaps not
coincidentally, the second derivative suit in Korea where shareholders
won a judgment against directors of a Korean corporation was against
Samsung Electronics. 223  Nonetheless, Samsung Electronics is an
outlier in terms of market capitalization among KSE-listed firms.
Without significant changes to the U.S. securities class action regime
as adopted in Korea to encourage more actions against smaller firms,
it is unclear what impact a class action regime will have in Korea
outside of the top thirty listed firms on the KSE.
At least two possible caveats should be noted to the problem of
firm size for implementing a securities class action regime in Korea.
First, even if private class actions target only large companies such as
Samsung Electronics, this nonetheless may have a significant impact
on shareholder wealth in Korea. Samsung Electronics alone accounts
for 20 percent of the overall market capitalization for all listed
companies on the KSE. 224 Compare this to the U.S., where no single
company represents a significant fraction of the total market
capitalization. Providing class action-style deterrence solely against
220. Id.
221. NYSE Fact Book 2002, available at http://www.nysedata.com/factbook/viewer-
edition.asp?mode=tables&key=34&category=5.
222. See http://www.nysedata.com/factbookvieweredition.asp?mode=table&key=268&
category=14 (NYSE Overview Statistics for 2004).
223. See Boong-Kyu Lee, Don Quixote or Robin Hood?: Minority Shareholder Rights and
Corporate Governance in Korea, 15 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 345 (2002) (reporting that "a court of first
impression awarded damages of W97.7 billion" against eleven former and current directors of
Samsung Electronics).
224. See Korea Stock Exchange Fact Book 2002, supra note 218, at 33 (noting that the
market capitalization of Samsung Electronics was 51,542.5 billion won while the total market
capitalization of listed companies was 258,680.8 billion won in 2002).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Samsung Electronics, therefore, may have some value for overall
shareholder welfare in Korea.
Second, many companies are members of Chaebol groups in
Korea. 225  To the extent fraud and other forms of managerial
misbehavior are conducted by the Chaebol as a whole, focusing on
individual market capitalizations may be misleading. Plaintiffs'
attorneys in Korea may very well bring class actions against groups of
companies belonging to the same Chaebol as opposed to class actions
against individual companies. Such classes of defendants may give
plaintiffs' attorneys the necessary size and potential damage awards
to make a class action worthwhile. On the other hand, the Chaebol
ownership structure immediately interposes shareholders with
significant holdings (for example, other member corporations of the
Chaebol) that may take a pro-defendant stance and, at the very least,
reduce the potential class award available by opting out of any class
action. These holdings may at the worst work to obstruct and stop
any class action.
B. Regime Choices
In the abstract, securities fraud class actions may seem like an
all-or-nothing alternative. However, the U.S. experience with the
PSLRA and other reforms has demonstrated that there exist several
choices in how to operate a securities class action regime. The
difficulty with adjusting the class action regime for Korea lies in
balancing three separate problems: (1) the problem of blocking
frivolous suits while allowing meritorious suits, (2) the lack of
incentive of plaintiffs' attorneys to focus on smaller companies, and (3)
the agency problem between plaintiffs' attorneys and the plaintiff
class. Solutions to one problem often heighten one or both of the other
problems. Reforms such as the PSLRA, for example, were designed to
reduce the incidence of frivolous suits. Such reforms, however, may
have also raised costs generally for plaintiffs' attorneys, reducing the
incidence of all types of suits, including "soft" meritorious suits not
based on hard indicia of fraud (for example, an accounting
restatement) publicly known prior to the filing of suit.
The balance struck among these three competing
considerations in the U.S. may not match the balance that is optimal
for Korea or other countries contemplating securities class actions.
Tweaking the various litigation options available in implementing a
225. The Chaebol are large, family-owned, controlled conglomerates in Korea. Large
Chaebol groups include Hyundai and Samsung.
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U.S.-style class action regime may help tailor such actions to the
Korean context. For example, the Korean bar is more tightly knit
than the bar in the U.S. due to the smaller number of attorneys in
Korea and the concentration of attorneys in Seoul, the capital city.226
The Korean government as a result may have more indirect and
informal means of sanctioning plaintiffs' attorneys who knowingly
engage in frivolous suits, reducing the risk of frivolous suits. Ham
Jung-Ho, the President of the Korean Bar Association, wrote that for
attorneys in Korea, the "legal profession is regarded as a profession
with public duties rather than as a profession which simply provides
legal services or even as a commercial business. '227 The small number
and relative homogeneity among attorneys reinforces the power of
reputation and group peer pressure in moderating attorney
behavior. 228 Plaintiffs' attorneys in Korea may be arguably more
disinclined to file purely frivolous lawsuits if such actions will result
in negative reputation among peers for the attorneys filing suits. 229
Not only is the risk of frivolous suits arguably lower in Korea,
the benefits from meritorious suits may also be higher. To the extent
at least some segments of the investor population in Korea are less
sophisticated than in the U.S. and fewer individual Korean investors
invest through more sophisticated investment funds, the risk of actual
fraud is heightened. A more liberal securities class action regime may
therefore prove more valuable in Korea.
226. See infra notes 246-250 and accompanying text (discussing the low number of attorneys
in Korea).
227. Ham Jung-Ho, The Unique Characteristics of the Korean Attorneys' System, 18 DICK. J.
INT'L L. 171, 171 (1999). Ham goes on to write that "the Korean Attorneys Act defines the term
attorney as a legal professional with public duties and provides that the duties of an attorney
shall be to protect the fundamental human rights and to ensure that the social justice shall be
realized." Id.
228. This homogeneity is furthered by a common training system for all lawyers. See Jae
Won Kim, The Ideal and the Reality of the Korean Legal Profession, 2 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 2,
48 (2001). Kim writes:
Those who want to be lawyers in Korea must first pass the judicial exam, and only
successful examinees obtain the privilege of entering the most elite institution in
Korea, the Judicial Research and Training Institute ("JRTI"). At the JRTI, all
trainees are treated as functionaries of the government. They not only enjoy official
status but also receive a salary from the government. Over a two-year period, the
JRTI provides practical training rather than advanced legal education. All Korean
lawyers, whether judges, prosecutors or practicing attorneys, receive further training
in the same institution.
Id.
229. Kim notes, however, that the homogeneity puts a premium on personal connections and
may help foster corruption among attorneys. Id. at 48-49.
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Consider the following, nonexhaustive list of policy levers
available to those seeking to implement a securities class actions
regime.
Range of Plaintiffs and Defendants. The U.S. does not adopt a
uniform approach in determining who should be defendants in class
actions. Section 11 of the Securities Act defines a list of defendants
including underwriters, directors, and auditors (but only with respect
to the audited financials). 230 Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, on
the other hand, provides no such definition. 23' Finally, Rule 10b-5
simply provides that any person who makes an "untrue statement of a
material fact or. . . omit[s] to state a material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading" may be liable to those who "in
connection" with the fraud purchase or sell securities. 232
Providing for a wide range of potential defendants, all other
things being equal, will increase the expected return from litigation
and induce more class action lawsuits. Deep-pocket defendants such
as underwriters and auditors hold the greatest promise of increasing
the return for plaintiffs' attorneys. Expanding the range of plaintiffs
may also help induce more plaintiffs' attorneys to file suit against
relatively smaller Korean companies. For example, Korea could
choose not to follow the tracing rule of Section 11 of the Securities Act
in the United States and thereby create a larger plaintiff class for
fraud litigation in the context of Korean IPOs. 233
The same financial reward designed to attract plaintiffs'
attorneys to file suit against truly fraudulent companies, however,
may also induce a greater amount of frivolous litigation. Such a shift
in the legal regime, therefore, should be considered only to the extent
policymakers in Korea believe (a) the incentives to engage in frivolous
230. See 15 U.S.C.A. §77k(a).
231. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 771(a)(2). Instead, the Supreme Court has detailed (in a case
involving the related 15 U.S.C.A. § 771(1)) that those in privity as well as those who solicit offers
to buy may be defendants. See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 647 (1988) (holding that "liability
extends only to the person who successfully solicits the purchase, motivated at least in part by a
desire to serve his own financial interest or those of the securities owner").
232. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
233. See, e.g., Abbey v. Computer Memories, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 870, 872 (N.D. Cal. 1986)
(finding that Section 11 requires that plaintiffs be able to trace their shares to the registration
statement in which fraud is being alleged). Korea could also consider expanding the class of
potential Rule 10b-5 plaintiffs to include secondary participants under a theory of aiding and
abetting liability as rejected in the U.S. by the Supreme Court in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v.
First Interstate Bank ofDenver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
[Vol. 57:5:14651512
2004] THE EVIDENCE ON SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS 1513
litigation are less among Korean attorneys, 234 (b) the Korean
government has better means of detecting and disciplining attorneys
specializing in frivolous litigation than in the U.S.,235 or (c) the threat
of actual fraud is greater in Korea. 236
Elements of the Cause of Action. The U.S. securities laws
require plaintiffs to prove various elements depending on what type of
private cause of action the plaintiffs are attempting to bring. Section
11 requires that plaintiffs only show a material misstatement or
omission where a duty to disclose exists in the registration statement
for a public offering. 237 Section 12(a)(2) similarly requires a material
misstatement or omission and that the fraud occur "by means of a
prospectus."238  Rule 10b-5, on the other hand, requires plaintiffs to
show not only materiality but also scienter on the part of the
defendants, plaintiffs reliance, and loss causation. 239
The incentive of plaintiffs' attorneys to bring a class action
depends on the cost of litigating the case and the probability of
winning a judgment (or convincing the defendant to settle for a large
monetary amount). The more elements plaintiffs are required to
prove, the lower the threat of a class action and the smaller the
incentive plaintiffs' attorneys will have to file the action in the first
place. On the other hand, the easier the case becomes for plaintiffs'
attorneys to prove, the greater the amount of arguably frivolous
litigation.
As with the question of who should have standing to sue and
who should be defendants in a securities class action, Korean
regulators may wish to consider the relative risks of frivolous
litigation and actual fraud occurring in the absence of private
litigation within Korea and how such risks differ compared with the
U.S. The lack of incentives for attorneys to bring class actions against
smaller Korean companies, coupled with the difficulty in creating the
necessary institutional infrastructure to support class actions
234. Korean attorneys may have fewer incentives to engage in frivolous litigation perhaps
due to the tight-knit community of attorneys in Korea that may result in peer pressure against
such suits. See supra notes 227-228 and accompanying text.
235. A greater ability to detect and discipline attorneys, for example, may result from the
higher level of intervention the Korean government makes generally in the Korean economy.
236. The risk of fraud could be greater in Korea either because investors are less
sophisticated or corporate managers lack a norm of catering to shareholder interests.
237. 15 U.S.C.A. §77k(a).
238. 15 U.S.C.A. § 771(a)(2).
239. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 701-97 (3d
ed. 2001) (providing a survey of the various elements of a Rule 10b-5 cause of action). Plaintiffs
must also show that the fraud occurred "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security"
and take place "by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce." Id.
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discussed below, may lead Korean regulators to err on the side of
imposing less stringent requirements for an antifraud private cause of
action.240
Class Action Procedure. The PSLRA implemented the
presumption that the lead plaintiff, who among other things selects
the lead counsel, is the plaintiff who has the largest financial interest
in the litigation (among those seeking the lead plaintiff position). In
theory, such a provision works best where a large number of
institutional investors exist in the capital markets, providing for a
pool of possible institutional lead plaintiffs. In practice, this regime
has not resulted in a flood of new institutional lead plaintiffs in the
U.S.241 Korea, which has a far smaller percentage of institutional
investors in its capital markets, may wish to consider whether a lead
plaintiff provision would have even less of an effect in aligning the
interests of the investor class with the plaintiffs' attorneys compared
with in the U.S.
Safe Harbors. The PSLRA implemented a forward-looking
statement safe harbor under Sections 27A and 21E of the Securities
Act and Exchange Act, respectively.242 Such safe harbors are not
necessarily cost-free. While decreased liability may reduce the risk of
companies in disclosing forward-looking information, more
opportunistic companies may take advantage of the safe harbor to
disclose less meaningful, if not misleading, forecasts about the
respective company's future. JKN (2001) nonetheless found no
evidence of reduced quality forward-looking statements in the post-
PSLRA period. 243
In considering whether to implement a safe harbor such as the
one for forward-looking statements in the U.S., Korea should consider
whether the risk of such a law encouraging decreased quality forward-
looking disclosures is higher in Korea. Where top corporate officers
are not accustomed to providing information readily to the market or,
more generally, catering to the interests of dispersed public
shareholders, the risk may be greater that the top officers may fail to
provide accurate or meaningful forward-looking information. In such
a situation, reducing or even eliminating the forward-looking
statement safe harbor may prove more beneficial for investors in
Korea.
240. See infra Part IV.C. (discussing the lack of institutional support for a class action
system in Korea).
241. See supra notes 189-193 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
243. JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 206, at 322-23.
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Liability. The PSLRA introduced proportionate liability for
some types of claims, including most notably Rule 10b-5 claims. The
proportionate liability system is not uniform in U.S. securities law.
Under Section 11, defendants continue to face joint and several
liability, except for outside directors who do enjoy proportionate
liability.
In implementing a U.S.-style class action system, Korea faces a
choice between joint and several as well as proportionate liability.
Here again, Korea should consider how its situation differs from that
of the U.S. Corporate insiders often are highly culpable when fraud
occurs, at least when compared with outside auditors and
underwriters. Suppose that in Korea, such insiders arguably have a
greater ability to escape liability by leaving the country with their
assets than top officers do in the United States. 244 Under such
conditions, imposing a proportionate liability system may unduly
restrict the ability of investors to obtain damages for securities
liability (to the extent the proportional liability of the remaining
defendants such as auditors and underwriters is capped at 150
percent of their liability portion as in the United States).245
Whether reduced liability for underwriters and auditors is
desirable is contingent upon the question of the importance of liability
in Korea in inducing underwriters and auditors to police companies ex
ante for fraud. The answer depends on what other incentives
underwriters and auditors have to monitor companies in Korea.
Larger, multinational auditors and underwriters may depend on their
reputation to generate future profitable business and thus voluntarily
police for fraud to maintain their reputation, although Enron and
Arthur Andersen provide a counterexample. Domestic, smaller
securities professionals may not have the same amount of reputation
at stake and will therefore require the threat of legal liability to
bolster their incentives to police for fraud. Providing joint and several
liability for smaller securities professionals would help raise the legal
liability facing these professionals and compensate for the lower
reputational constraints on such smaller market participants.
244. Consider the example of Daewoo founder Kim Woo-joong who fled Korea in the late
1990s. Cf. Iggy Kim, South Korea: Daewoo Motors Workers Strike, available at http://www.
greenleft.org.aufbackI2001/437/437p21b.htm ("Since the Daewoo Group's collapse in late 1998,
tens of billions of dollars of public funds have been spent to salvage Daewoo Motors. In 1999,
Daewoo Group president Kim Woo-joong disappeared with these funds, amounting to a third of
the South Korean government's budget.").
245. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
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C. Institutional Structure
Aside from the formal law on the books, the presence of
sophisticated institutional players is crucial in developing a low cost,
economical class action system. The number and sophistication of
institutions that could potentially deal with class actions in Korea
differ from the United States. In adopting a class action system,
regulators in Korea should consider the impact of institutional
differences on the effectiveness of class actions.
1. Plaintiffs' Attorneys
The United States enjoys (or, depending on one's point of view,
is afflicted with) an active professional securities plaintiffs' attorney
bar. Specializing in securities class actions grants such firms
particular advantages. Firms that specialize in these suits are better
able to develop expertise in pursuing a securities class action,
reducing the cost of pursuing any one case. The large size and stature
of at least some of the plaintiffs' firms provide a natural focal point for
investors unhappy with the performance of their firms. Such
investors may help provide information on allegedly fraudulent firms
that is useful for the plaintiffs' attorney in determining whether to file
a class action complaint. Larger plaintiffs' firms are also able to
pursue multiple class actions at any one time, allowing for some
diversification of the risk that any one class action may not result in a
positive return for the firms. Diversification may also occur across
firms, as several plaintiffs' firms may jointly share in the co-
representation of different classes across several different lawsuits.
Countries, such as Korea, considering the implementation of a
private securities fraud class action regime must contend with a lack
of well-developed plaintiffs' attorneys firms. South Korea has only
about five thousand practicing attorneys but has a total population of
forty-eight million people.2 46 In contrast, the state of California has
approximately 144,000 active attorneys providing services for a
population of thirty-five million people.247 Not only are the total
number of attorneys limited in Korea, but many attorneys are quite
fragmented. Compared with the United States, Korea has only a few
246. Misasha Suzuki, The Protectionist Bar Against Foreign Lawyers in Japan, China, and
Korea: Domestic Control in the Face of Internationalization, 16 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 385, 391-92
(2003). See also Kim, supra notes 228-229, at 46-47 (noting that "Korea has approximately 6,900
licensed lawyers, including roughly 1,400 judges, 1,200 prosecutors, and 4,300 practicing
attorneys.").
247. The State Bar of California, Membership Demographics, at http://members.calbar.ca.
gov/search/demographics.aspx (visited on December 3, 2003).
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large law firms with over a hundred attorneys. 248 Korea, moreover,
has resisted allowing foreign law firms to practice law within its
borders. 249  Further, the paucity of legal services in Korea is
aggravated by Korea's difficult bar entrance exam that annually
allows in only one thousand new licensed attorneys per year.250
Not only will potential plaintiffs' attorneys in Korea lack the
experience to pursue class actions in a cost-effective manner, but the
plaintiffs' attorneys will not enjoy the same scale advantages as their
U.S. counterparts, resulting in fewer cases for any particular
plaintiffs' attorney and less diversification among attorneys. The
combination of higher costs and reduced diversification will result in
Korean plaintiffs' attorneys focusing their attention even more on only
larger dollar value class actions with clear evidence of fraud.
Of course, some larger plaintiffs' attorneys firms may
eventually appear in Korea over time, especially if filing class actions
in Korea turns out to be profitable. The smaller size of Korea's capital
market, however, necessarily will result in fewer potential litigation
targets as compared with the U.S. As a result, Korea's market will
likely support only a small number of professional plaintiffs' attorneys
firms. One consequence of having fewer firms will be less competition
among plaintiffs' attorneys to become lead counsel in any particular
class action, thereby resulting in higher attorney's fees and a lower
recovery for the class.
2. Courts and Judges
If Korea adopts a securities class action system, what courts
should handle these types of cases? Presently, Korea employs a
number of specialized courts. For example, Korea has a bankruptcy
court with specialized bankruptcy judges to help administer and
adjudicate bankruptcy proceedings. Employing a similarly specialized
court with expert judges may provide significant benefits to a
shareholder class action system in Korea, as opposed to the U.S.-based
securities class action experience where, in federal court, litigants
typically deal with more generalist judges. 251 Specialized judges may
develop expertise in distinguishing between frivolous and meritorious
248. Aurora Law Offices in Korea identifies five law firms in Korea with over 120 attorneys
including: Kim & Chang; Lee & Ko; Shin & Kim; Bae, Kim & Lee; and Woo, Yun, Kang, Jeong &
Han. http://www.auroralaw.co.kr/en/about/otherfirms.html (last visited on December 6,
2003).
249. Suzuki, supra note 246, at 391-92.
250. Id.
251. See Black et al., supra note 4 at 569 (proposing a specialized court to handle large or
complex commercial and financial litigation set up as a branch of the District Court).
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claims and therefore become more willing to sanction frivolous suits.
Such judges may also apply certain doctrines, such as proportionate
liability, more consistently - a task which requires expertise in
assigning culpability across defendants. Litigants faced with the
same set of repeat judges may also obtain a higher degree of
predictability of judicial outcomes, leading to a greater probability of
settlement.
On the other hand, the minimum size requirement before
plaintiffs' attorneys file suit will likely result in only a small number
of class actions per year, absent significant departures from the U.S.
system of class actions to encourage more class actions. While a
specialized securities class action court would greatly assist those
seeking to bring class actions as well as help weed out frivolous from
meritorious claims, the presence of a specialized court alone is
unlikely to result in many class actions. Particularly because the
present Korean judiciary has a relative lack of experience in business
matters,252 the lack of a high volume of class actions will make
developing expertise among generalist judges difficult.
3. Shareholder interests
The presence of institutional investors able to take an active
role with respect to class actions also represents an important factor
in gauging the probability of success of implementing a new securities
class action regime in Korea. Measured as a percentage of trading
volume on the KSE, individuals accounted for 71.8 percent of the
trading volume. 253 Korean institutional investors, including banks
and pension funds, among others, accounted for only 16.7 percent of
the trading volume. 254 While foreigners accounted for an additional
11.5 percent of the trading volume, foreigners are unlikely to take an
active or effective role in leading a Korean securities fraud class action
due to language barriers and a lack of familiarity with the Korean
legal system. 255
252. See Lee, supra note 223, at 350-51 ("The judiciary traditionally has been more involved
in social, as opposed to business, issues, leaving economic adjudication to the government
bureaucrats at the Presidential Secretariat, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Trade and
Industry. Naturally, without a tradition of litigating economic and management issues, it is
probably safe to say that the expertise level of the Korean judiciary is well-short of that of
Delaware.").
253. Korea Stock Exchange Fact Book 2002, supra note 218, at 23 (2003).
254. Id.
255. Id. On the other hand, foreigners used to using litigation in their home countries (for
example, the United States) may also seek to do so in Korea. The lack of a plaintiffs' attorney
bar to help lead such litigation, however, may hinder even the most litigation-prone foreign
investor. Even in the U.S., moreover, institutional investors have participated only reluctantly (if
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Stock ownership patterns present a slightly different picture
for firms listed on the KSE. Individuals own only 22.3 percent of the
market value of KSE listed firms.2 56  Foreigners account for an
additional 36.6 percent.257 For institutions, however, a similar pattern
results: Korean institutional investors have a relatively smaller
presence in the KSE compared with U.S. institutions within the U.S.
capital markets. Private institutional investors (banks, securities
companies, insurance companies, investment trusts, and other
financial institutions) in the aggregate account for only 15.7 percent of
the stock ownership. 258 The remainder of the shares are in the hands
of either the government (or other public body) or another corporation
(often a Chaebol affiliate company).259
The lack of many large institutional investors often leaves the
plaintiff class without any potentially large plaintiffs' representatives.
Absent such a representative, the danger of plaintiffs' attorneys
grabbing a lion's share of a damages award for their fees in a class
action lawsuit without exerting much effort is more acute. Moreover,
one possible solution, the lead plaintiff provisions in the U.S., has
failed to garner much interest from the numerous institutions in the
U.S. marketplace and would be unlikely to apply in Korea (due to the
relative dearth of institutional investors). 260
Two additional interesting features exist with respect to
shareholder interests in Korea. First, certain specialized shareholder
interest groups have arisen in recent years to pursue derivative suits
among other pro-shareholder actions against directors and officers of
select Korean firms. The People's Solidarity of Participatory
Democracy ("PSPD"), a non-profit government organization, has
actively engaged in pro-minority shareholder activities over the past
several years, including leading the recent derivative suit against
at all) in both leading class actions and filing claims for awards as part of settlements. See supra
notes 189-192 and accompanying text.
256. Id. at 36.
257. Id.
258. Id. Questions exist, as well, as to the independence of Korean institutional investors.
See, e.g., Ok-Rial Song, The Legacy of Controlling Minority Structure: A Kaleidoscope Corporate
Governance Reform in Korean Chaebol, 34 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 183, 215 (2002) ("[Blanks are
in effect controlled by the government, non-bank financial institutions like insurance companies
or investment companies are themselves owned by chaebol, and most non-financial institutions
are chaebol-affiliated firms locked into a circular-shareholding structure. Therefore, few
institutional investors would be willing to monitor controlling families or even the individual
managers of affiliated firms.").
259. Id.
260. See supra notes 222-224 and accompanying text.
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Samsung Electronics. 261 To the extent specialized plaintiffs' attorneys
focusing on class actions fail to arise, the PSPD may continue to fill
the gap. Regulators in Korea should consider allowing an award
similar in size to the contingency fees received by plaintiffs' attorneys
in the U.S. for pro-shareholder groups who initiate and successfully
pursue a securities class action. Of course, the PSPD may not wish to
accept any money for fear of tarnishing its social activist reputation.
A more generalized bounty nonetheless has the potential of
encouraging other more profit-oriented entrepreneurs to step into the
vacuum created by the lack of attorneys pursuing derivative suit
litigation.
Second, Korean stock ownership patterns reveal that a large
fraction of shares in Korean companies are held by other corporations
(17.2 percent). 262 To the extent many of these other corporations are
members of the same Chaebol family, a further complication arises in
how to determine who should be the lead plaintiff. Often the
shareholders with the largest financial interest in the litigation may
very well be other companies who are members of the same Chaebol
group as the company targeted for a securities fraud suit. At a
minimum, these Chaebol shareholders may simply opt out of the class,
reducing the potential damage awards for plaintiffs' attorneys and
thus the incentive of such attorneys to file suit in the first place. At
worst, the Chaebol shareholders may attempt to control the class
action, claiming a right to do so based upon their large financial stake
in the interest. Allowing Chaebol shareholders to obtain control of the
class, however, would result in very high incentives on the part of the
class to simply drop the suit or settle for a nominal amount to
minimize the litigation cost to the Chaebol as a whole.
D. The New Class Action Law in Korea
After years of consideration, the Korean government finally
enacted a securities class action law in January 2004.263 Under the
261. See Lee, supra note 223, at 355-56 ("The PEC [a part of the PSPD], established in
January 1997, was founded and is led by Hasung Jang, a professor at Korea University. The
PEC is comprised of a diverse group of experts, including corporate attorneys, accountants, and
academics. The Participatory Economy Committee has three full-time paid and about twenty
volunteers, with its budget raised from membership dues and donations."). See also Jooyoung
Kim and Joongi Kim, Shareholder Activism in Korea: A Review of How PSPD Has Used Legal
Measures to Strengthen Korean Corporate Governance, 1 J. KOREAN L. 51, 53 (2001) (describing
the PSPD's shareholder-oriented activities).
262. Korea Stock Exchange Fact Book 2002, supra note 218, at 36.
263. Ryu Jin, Assembly Passes Watered-Down Class Action Bill, KOREA TIMES, Dec. 22, 2003,
available at http://times.hankooki.comltimes.htm.
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new law, companies listed on the KSE or KOSDAQ, as well as a
delineated list of related parties such as directors, auditors, and
underwriters, may face a securities class action for, among other
things, fraud in a registration statement or prospectus, fraud in an
annual, semi-annual, or quarterly report, insider trading, and market
manipulation. 264 The new law is patterned somewhat on the U.S.
system of class actions, providing for public notice of the class action,
court appointment of a lead plaintiff, court certification of the class,
and court approval of any settlement arising from the class action.
Unlike the U.S. system, the new Korean law imposes a
minimum shareholding requirement on shareholders seeking to
initiate the class action. At least fifty shareholders who, in the
aggregate, hold 0.01 percent or more of the equity may bring a class
action suit against a company.265 The Korean law also provides that
only the very largest Korean companies (those with assets in excess of
US $1.67 billion) are exposed to the possibility of a class action suit
from the effective date of the law on January 1, 2005. Nonetheless,
starting on January 1, 2007, the minimum asset size requirement of
US $1.67 billion will expire, exposing smaller, listed companies to
class action suits.266
The new class action law in Korea marks a step in the right
direction for improving the corporate governance environment.
Providing for class actions will help lay the foundation for the
initiation of at least a modicum of class action suits. As discussed
above, the initial number of suits is likely to be small due to the size
effect. Even without the initial restriction on class actions to only the
largest Korean firms, the size effect will deter many private plaintiffs
from pursuing suit against smaller firms.267
Even a small number of class action suits may nonetheless
enhance investor welfare in Korea. Direct benefits include the
deterrent effects on the controlling shareholders of the largest
corporations. To the extent that the political power of the largest
corporations insulates the controlling shareholders at least partially
from government enforcement, private class actions may provide a
particularly valuable and complementary enforcement mechanism to
the securities laws. Furthermore, some number of class actions each
264. See Young-Cheol Jeong, Securities-Related Class Actions in Korea, International Bar
Association Newsletter (2003) (describing aspects of the securities class action bill in Korea).
265. Jin, supra note 263.
266. Id.
267. On the other hand, not all plaintiffs are driven solely by economic concerns. To the
extent the PSPD remains a viable force in Korea, the restriction to the largest Korean firms may
nonetheless reduce the number of class actions.
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year will help develop expertise within the courts in administering
class actions (for example, in selecting a lead plaintiff, dismissing
frivolous complaints, etc.), thereby reducing the costs for future class
actions. Over time, more groups in addition to the PSPD may bring
class actions and generate economies of scale in pursuing a greater
number of suits. As the number of class actions grows over time, the
constituencies that benefit from such actions (investors, attorneys,
and plaintiffs advocacy groups such as the PSPD) will gain more
influence. Such enhanced influence will assist them in their efforts to,
at the very least, block efforts to curtail class actions in Korea and
eventually to expand the scope of class actions.
Given the structural biases against class actions within Korea
and the importance of encouraging the growth of such actions under
the new class action law, the minimum shareholding requirement is
troublesome. It is precisely for the very largest corporations that the
0.01 percent shareholding requirement imposes the largest barrier.
For a company such as Samsung Electronics with a market
capitalization of $39.1 billion, shareholders initiating a class action
must hold a total number of shares valued at $3.91 million, a
considerable sum out of the reach of many individual investors and
associated shareholder advocacy groups such as the PSPD. The
minimum shareholding requirement thus undercuts the class action
law in the primary area where the law would otherwise have the most
impact - for the largest companies.
V. CONCLUSION
Securities class actions have an appealing attraction to those
seeking to deter fraud. If a party commits fraud that affects
hundreds, if not thousands of dispersed shareholders, allowing a
plaintiffs' attorney to aggregate the claims into a single class action
makes the pursuit of such claims both more manageable and
economical. While most countries do not allow for securities class
actions, the United States, with the largest capital market in the
world, does. It is therefore tempting to link causally the presence of
securities fraud class actions with deterrence against fraud and then
finally with large, developed capital markets, as in the U.S.
Nevertheless, problems may emerge when a country blindly
adopts U.S.-style class actions. Even within the United States,
securities class actions have not garnered uniform praise. During the
mid-1990s, Congress responded to the perception that many securities
class actions were frivolous with the enactment of the PSLRA. The
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PSLRA may very well have increased the importance of merit-related
factors in determining which companies will face a securities class
action as well as settlement outcomes. Evidence surrounding the
consequences of PSLRA nonetheless highlights several important
issues with which regulators in the U.S. must contend in charting the
course for securities class actions in the future.
In particular, the shift in claims in the post-PSLRA time period
toward cases involving more hard evidence of fraud, such as an
accounting restatement or SEC enforcement action, may allow
plaintiffs' attorneys more easily to meet the pleading with
particularity requirement of the PSLRA. This shift, however, may
also leave untouched many actual instances of fraud that do not
involve such a "smoking gun." By raising the costs of pursuing a
securities fraud class action, while also reducing the probability of
success, the PSLRA may have resulted in plaintiffs' attorneys
refocusing their efforts on only companies engaged in obvious (at the
time of filing) instances of fraud. Similarly, for all types of claims,
whether frivolous or meritorious, the PSLRA generally may have
raised the minimum threshold of company size for plaintiffs' attorneys
to pay any attention at all. Particularly for countries with a smaller
capital market, and thus fewer large market capitalization companies
than in the U.S., implementing a post-PSLRA, U.S.-style class action
regime may result in only a relatively small number of firms ever
facing the risk of a securities class action.
Countries considering whether to implement U.S.-style class
actions must also confront a dearth of several institutional factors that
make class actions more viable within the United States. Absent a set
of professional plaintiffs' attorneys, the cost to attorneys and other
groups of initiating a class action is likely to be higher. Furthermore,
lacking securities class action notice firms, such as Gilardi &
Company in the United States, the cost to attorneys of notifying the
class will be greater. These higher costs, in turn, will exacerbate the
tendencies of plaintiffs' attorneys to focus only on larger companies
offering greater potential damage awards. Even where some
professional plaintiffs' attorneys may arise within a country such as
Korea, the small size of the capital markets will necessarily restrict
the number and scope of such law firms. Fewer plaintiffs' attorneys
firms vying with one another to lead a class action may then result in
higher attorney fees as well as less vigorous prosecution of class action
claims, to the extent a plaintiffs' attorney only captures a fraction of
any award obtained for the class.
To a certain extent, countries considering securities class
actions may address some of the concerns of class actions by tailoring
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their nation's class actions regime to their own specific context.
However, no easy remedy exists that will completely solve (a) the
problem of frivolous suits and the need to allow meritorious suits, (b)
the lack of incentive of plaintiffs' attorneys to focus on smaller
companies, and (c) the agency problem between plaintiffs' attorneys
and the plaintiff class. Reforms, such as the PSLRA, that are aimed
at mitigating the incidence of frivolous suits tend to elevate costs for
plaintiffs' attorneys, thereby reducing the incidence of all types of
suits, including meritorious suits. The PSLRA may also have led
attorneys to shift away from more "soft" instances of fraud to cases
involving hard prefiling indicia of fraud, such as misstatements
contained in an accounting restatement. Aligning the incentives of
plaintiffs' attorneys with the plaintiff class may at first glance help
the class. However, to the extent the profitability of plaintiffs'
attorneys is lessened as more value is transferred to the class,
plaintiffs' attorneys may further reduce the number of class actions
brought against smaller companies.
Securities class actions are not the only way to keep managers
and companies honest in their dealings with investors in the market.
For example, Korea has a long tradition of highly qualified
professionals joining government service. Bureaucrats in Korea often
spend their entire careers in government and develop deep and broad
expertise in their particular areas. Faced with the probability of a
weak and ineffectual private deterrent against fraud (at least in the
case of class actions), Korea may wish to consider expanding the roles
of the Ministry of Justice, Securities and Futures Commission, and
Fair Trade Commission and other government agencies in providing
more public enforcement. 268  Such a strategy may be particularly
useful for smaller companies, where private litigants may simply lack
any incentive to monitor or file litigation.
Nonetheless, securities class actions do hold promise in
harnessing private incentives to police for fraud. While private
plaintiffs may find class actions economically viable only against the
largest Korean corporations, class actions directed against such
entities may provide a number of benefits for Korea. In terms of
dollar losses, fraud within the largest corporations has the greatest
negative impact on Korean investors. In addition, the political power
of the largest Chaebol makes it difficult for government enforcement
to work effectively, giving private class actions an important
268. See also Black et al., supra note 4, at 170 ("Consideration should be given to creating a
national prosecution unit for commercial, corporate and securities matters and to creating a
specialized career path within this unit.").
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complementary enforcement role. Other countries with a similar
political dynamic (for example, where larger corporations enjoy great
political influence) may look to private class actions as a substitute
means to enforce the securities laws. Lastly, once even a few private
class actions become the norm within Korea, institutions including
more expert courts and greater numbers of private entities and
attorney firms specializing in class actions will develop, reducing the
cost of pursuing subsequent class actions.

